Soviet Influence in British India: Intelligence and Paranoia within Imperial Government in the Interwar Years by Sielaff, Alan
University of Colorado, Boulder
CU Scholar
Undergraduate Honors Theses Honors Program
Spring 2011
Soviet Influence in British India: Intelligence and
Paranoia within Imperial Government in the
Interwar Years
Alan Sielaff
University of Colorado Boulder
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.colorado.edu/honr_theses
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Honors Program at CU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Honors
Theses by an authorized administrator of CU Scholar. For more information, please contact cuscholaradmin@colorado.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sielaff, Alan, "Soviet Influence in British India: Intelligence and Paranoia within Imperial Government in the Interwar Years" (2011).
Undergraduate Honors Theses. Paper 679.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Soviet Influence in British India: 
Intelligence and Paranoia within Imperial Government in the Interwar Years 
 
By Alan Sielaff 
 
University of Colorado 
Department of History 
Honors Thesis 
Spring 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Thesis Advisor: Lucy Chester, HIST 
Honors Advisor: Anne Lester, HIST 
Outside Advisor: Fernando Riosmena, GEOG 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
  The British Empire found itself challenged both at home and abroad 
following the Allied victory in World War I. Nationalism was burgeoning 
throughout its colonies, with India as Britain‟s greatest concern. At home the 
emergence of a Marxist regime in the newly established Soviet Union proved that 
a working class revolution was possible. With Britain fully industrialized, the 
Bolsheviks represented a mortal enemy to an imperial power such as the British 
Empire. Through a combination of hostile rhetoric originating from the Soviet 
Union, increased nationalist organization in India, and the historic rivalry in 
Central Asia, British leadership became wary of Soviet influence in its largest 
colony. The British colonial government was underfunded and under resourced in 
India when compared to its sheer size and population. Efforts to understand the 
growing political situation proved to be impossible. For the intelligence 
community in India, this meant that information had to be prioritized. The overall 
atmosphere of hostility to all things Bolshevik in British leadership predisposed 
its intelligence agencies to preferentially seek information on anything that could 
be connected back to the Soviet Union. What emerged was a picture of Bolshevik 
intrigue infiltrating into the Indian nationalist movement, allowing British 
leadership to partially blame the Soviet Union for the instability in India. The 
prejudice towards this strain of Indian nationalism was overplayed in the minds of 
the British, and allowed them to attach blame to a foreign power rather look 
towards their own treatment of Indians as reason enough to agitate for 
independence. 
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Introduction 
The foremost global power at the turn of the twentieth century hailed from a relatively 
small island in the northwest of Europe. Eastward into mainland Europe a rapidly industrializing 
Germany was poised to overtake France as Great Britain‟s chief rival. Further east saw the failed 
1905 revolution to overthrow the Russian Romanov Dynasty. 1905 also included a Japanese 
defeat of Russia over interests in northeastern China and Korea.  For the first time a non-
European state defeated a major European power. Stability in Europe in terms of social and 
political peace seemed as unsettled as any point in the previous one hundred years. Widely read 
works such as Edward Gibbons‟ The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire brought the concept 
of empire decay to the minds of citizens and officials of the British Empire.
2
 It is amidst this 
atmosphere of apprehension which Great Britain entered World War I in 1914, balancing a 
continental war on the one hand with colonial maintenance on the other. 
 Britain relied heavily on its colonies for both raw materials and manpower throughout the 
war. Residents of these lands served the British well and expected to be rewarded. As in Europe, 
nationalist organizations were beginning to exert greater pressure on their rulers for 
independence. This was partially a consequence of European education made available to some 
in the indigenous population. Education acted as a double-edged sword for the British. It lowered 
costs associated with employing British citizens in the civil services of its colonies, but also 
exposed the indigenous population to the ideals of liberal political philosophy. The British rarely 
turned down an opportunity to tout their achievements at “spreading civilization” and used 
liberal education to help justify their presence throughout the world.
3
 The Empire had to deal 
with the consequences, however, as educated young Indian nationalist leaders formed a national 
                                                 
2
 Piers Brendon, “Introduction,” in The Decline and Fall of the British Empire (New York: Knopf Publishing, 2008), 
xv-xxii. 
3
 Brendon, The Decline and Fall of the British Empire, xix. 
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congress in 1885 and slowly began accumulating concessions from the British government. 
These proved just enough for some Indian leaders to continue cooperating with the British. For 
others it was never enough as immediate independence became the demand. Nationalism would 
only increase following the contribution of India to the Allied victory in 1918 of World War I. 
And when liberties were restricted in India rather than expanded, mass demonstrations broke out. 
 Meanwhile in Russia, the 1917 abdication of Czar Nicholas II was a moment in history 
when a true changing of the guard took place. An untested ideology was suddenly at the helm of 
one of the world‟s greatest powers by means of revolution. Citizens and leaders in Europe and 
the United States suspicious of Bolshevism became swept up in the Red Scare. As a contrast, 
some in lands under colonial rule such as India saw the Marxist ideology as a viable alternative 
to what many saw as the exploitative nature of the capitalist model. This ideology openly 
condemned imperialism, labeling it as “the highest stage of capitalism” of which the young 
revolution in Russia sought to bring down.
4
 The newly established Soviet Union thus represented 
not just another potential global power, but one which threatened the very ideological 
foundations of the British Empire. 
The independence sentiment in India would also get a boost from one of United States 
President Woodrow Wilson‟s famous Fourteen Points. Of the points presented at the Paris Peace 
Conference of 1919 was the right to national self-determination. A major argument now could be 
leveled against the legitimacy of the British Empire. While national self-determination was 
declared to apply only to Europe, perhaps this obvious hypocrisy was also intended to swing the 
balance of power towards the United States. Popular colonial opinion and many leaders educated 
in Western universities saw this inclusion in the peace treaty ending World War I as vindication 
                                                 
4
 Vladimir I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (Zurich: 1916). 
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to their right to independence.
5
 In the arena of colonial justification, national self-determination 
could do nothing but harm the morale standing of an empire and embolden its opponents.  
The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia thus added an additional dynamic for the 
consideration of the British leadership in India. No longer was it simply a relationship between 
British and Indians regarding national self-determination and independence. The class-oriented 
structure of Marxism meant that as the phenomenon grew, there existed the potential for 
international involvement for what the British considered an internal matter. The British now 
potentially needed to have information on external matters to fully comprehend the political 
situation in India. This information came from the both the public realm, that of events and 
statements by political leaders, but also from non-public sources gathered from intelligence 
capabilities. The two sources combined to inform the leaders of the British Empire and in turn 
influence their understanding of the situation in India.  
There is a diverse collection of works regarding British intelligence on Soviet interests in 
India. This topic, however, is not so specific in scope for it to be useful to analyze a singular 
perspective. In order to assess the degree and reasoning of insecurity the British had regarding 
Soviet influence in India, it is necessary to investigate the motivations and capabilities from 
these three national perspectives. It is from these starting points academic works can first be 
divided, then into various subgroups within the respective literatures. Further, there are two time 
periods that have an abundance of work which can serve as an additional organizational criterion 
beyond the thematic groups which dominate the scholarship. It can be useful to keep in mind the 
                                                 
5
 See Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial 
Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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larger contemporary issues that potentially exert influence over their authors, this author being 
no exception. 
 The first large collection of work occurred from the late 1960s to early 1970s. Much of 
these works were by Indian scholars who sought to investigate the influence of socialism in the 
Indian nationalist movement.
6
 Perhaps this period was motivated because it was only a few years 
after India‟s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru,  was no longer in power. The opening of the 
Nehru Memorial Museum and Library had taken place in 1967 and so the intellectual community 
in India was eager to write his history and place it within a larger worldview.
7
 This period was 
also framed by the Cold War, in which India under Nehru had tried to maneuver itself into a non-
alignment stance diplomatically situated between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is 
within this context that these authors sought to frame India‟s independence movement as 
drawing on elements from both the liberal West and socialist Soviet Union. These works 
certainly have an Indian nationalist focus and are often by Indian scholars providing the 
historical context in the opening decades of a newly independent India. 
 The other period of time which yielded the most scholarship on this topic is during the 
past decade. The topic has often centered on notions of empire, imperial decline, and intelligence 
gathering services.
8
 While the subject of the British Empire has turned out a relatively consistent 
                                                 
6
 See Vijay Sen. Budhraj, “The Communist International and Indian Politics” in B.R. Nanda, ed., Socialsim in India 
(New Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1972), K.N. Chaudhuri, “Economic Problems and Indian Independence” 
in C.H. Philips and Mary Doreen Wainwright, eds., The Partition of India: Policies and Perspectives 1935-
1947 (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1970)), G.N. Dikshit, Gandhi’s Challenge to Communism (New 
Delhi: S. Chand & CO.,1972), Nanda, ed., Socialsim in India, Philips et al., The Partition of India: Policies 
and Perspectives 1935-1947,  Percival Spear, “A Third Force in India 1920-47: A Study in Political 
Analysis,” (in Philips et al., The Partition of India: Policies and Perspectives 1935-1947), and Iman Zafar, 
“The Rise of Soviet Russia and Socialism in India, 1917-1929,” in Nanda, ed. Socialsim in India. 
7
 Nanda, ed., “Preface,” in Socialsim in India. v-vi. 
8
 See Piers Brendon, The Decline and Fall of the British Empire (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), John Fisher, 
Gentleman Spies: Intelligence Agents in the British Empire and Beyond (Gloucestershire: Sutton 
Publishing, 2002), David French, “The British Army and the Empire” (in Greg Kennedy, ed., Imperial 
Denfence: The old world order 1856-1956 (New York: Routledge, 2008)), Andrew Muldoon, “The Cow is 
Still the Most Important Figure in India Politics!: Religion, Imperial Culture and the Shaping of Indian 
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amount of work for decades, the surge in the decade in these particular themes may also reflect 
contemporary issues. While Britain no longer has its empire, it has been popular to compare the 
United States‟ position in the world now with that of Britain pre-World War II. Moral issues 
surrounding the responsibility associated with imperialism frequented the minds of British 
leaders. The use of intelligence has been included in much recent scholarship regarding the role 
it served in the larger picture of empire, security, and effective rule. The parallel between the 
United States today and the British Empire of the past attracts many, just as comparisons of the 
British Empire to the Roman Empire did the same in prior centuries. 
There are two ways to organize scholarship on the Soviet Union useful for analyzing 
influence in India in the 1920s and 1930s. Some focus on the ideological motivations and 
inspiration the Soviet Union presented for Indian nationalists. To a lesser extent other pieces 
detail Soviet influence in terms of direct leadership, funding, and arms supplied to Indian 
communists. The works that were written preeminently in the 1960s and 1970s are largely those 
from the outgrowth of Indian nationalist works that investigated the influence of socialism on the 
movement.
9
 The more recent scholarship centering on the direct Soviet impact and its role in 
leading international communism has undoubtedly benefitted from the opening of the Soviet 
archives following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.
 10
 These works were able to investigate 
                                                                                                                                                             
Political Reform in the 1930” (The Parliamentary History Yearbook Trust, 2008, 67-81), Andrew Muldon, 
Empire, Politics and the Creation of the 1935 India Act (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 
2009), and Ann Laura Stroler, Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 2009). 
9
 See Budhraj, “The Communist International and Indian Politics,” in Nanda ed., Socialsim in India, John Haithcox, 
Communism and Nationalism in India: M.N. Roy and Commintern Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1971), and Zafar, “The Rise of Soviet Russia and Socialism in India, 1917-1929,” in 
Nanda, ed. Socialsim in India. 
10
 See Suchetana Chattopadhyay, “The Bolshevik Menace: Colonial Surveillance and the Origins of Socialist 
Politics in Calcutta,” (South Asia Research 26 (2006): 165-179), Larisa Efimova, “Did the Soviet Union 
Instruct Southeast Asian Communists to Revolt? New Russian Evidence on the Calcutta Youth Conference 
of February 1948,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 40 (2009): 449-469), Kieth Nielson, Britain, Soviet 
Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939 (Cambridge University Press, 2006), and Erik 
Van Ree, The Political Thought of Joseph Stalin, (RoutedgeCurzon: New York, 2002). 
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both the motivations the Soviet Union had for being interested in places such as India, and its 
subsequent actions. They generally do not look at India as a central topic as it seems to be too 
specific to generate enough evidence. This is an area that could benefit from expanded use of 
A.J. Farrington‟s Indian Political Intelligence Files, a source that will be a cornerstone of this 
work.
11
 The works addressing direct Soviet influence are fewer in number as India was just one 
of many places that the Soviets considered had potential for communist growth. 
The motivations of the Soviet Union to take an interest in India are rooted in scholarship 
on the international nature of Marxism. Jonathan Haslem is one example of analyzing Soviet 
foreign policy in this vein. His work places the behavior of the Soviet Union within the context 
of the global economic crisis triggered by the market crash in 1929.
12
 Haslem argues that the 
Soviet Union‟s foreign policy goals had to maintain a balance between capitalizing on the 
disarray of western economies while strengthening the Soviet economy. It hoped to display the 
superiority of communism over capitalism for all the world to see with the goal of hastening 
communism‟s supposed inevitable triumph. This was done while in addition attempting to 
prepare for a great European war that Soviet leaders such a Joseph Stalin believed to be coming 
as a result of the economic crisis.
13
 It is these other internal priorities that led to direct efforts to 
organize communist movements abroad to be tempered by the 1930s.
14
 At the same time 
elements within the Soviet government saw the failure of basic ground level campaigns in other 
nations as very frustrating to the ultimate goals of Marxism. Evidence backing up this point can 
                                                 
11
 A.J. Farrington, ed., Indian Political Intelligence Files 1912-1950 (Leiden, The Netherlands: IDC Press, 2000, 
microfiche). 
12
 Jonathan Haslem, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1930-33: The Impact of the Depression (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 
1983). 
13
 Haslem, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1930-33: The Impact of the Depression, 1. 
14
 Haslem, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1930-33: The Impact of the Depression, 8. 
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be seen in the example of India.
15
 Haslem says that foreign policy was “anything but monolithic” 
for the Soviet Union and blames these inconsistencies within the Soviet government for the 
failure of international communism.
16
 Internal disputes led to a lack of coordination between 
different sections of the government, an interesting parallel at the time to the government of the 
British Empire. 
For the Indian perspective the general pattern of scholarship could be categorized as one 
which focuses on biographical works of leading Indian nationalists. Within that field there are 
works that specifically focus on socialist influences in the lives of these nationalists and 
comments on how directly influenced they were by the Soviet Union. A group within the 
biographic scholars focuses on individual nationalists‟ possible sympathies for the Soviet Union 
rather than explicit Soviet efforts. This is especially true for works on the larger nationalist 
figures like Mohandas Gandhi or Jawaharlal Nehru. Attention centers more on Indian motives 
rather than Soviet motives.  This focus suggests that political sympathies had the largest impact 
on Indian politics in comparison to tangible efforts such as funding or arms on the part of the 
Soviets.
17
 Scholars here attempt to trace Indian socialism through individual biographies rather 
than national level politics and trends. This is argued through the words of prominent Indian 
nationalist leaders explaining why they adopted socialist sympathies, and the degree which they 
                                                 
15
 M.R. Masani, “The Communist Party in India” (Pacific Affairs, Vol.24 No.1, University of British Columbia, 
Mar. 1951, 18-38). 
16
 Haslem, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1930-33: The Impact of the Depression, 20. 
17
 See John Callaghan, Rajani Palme Dutt: A Study in British Stalinism (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1993), 
Dikshit, Gandhi’s Challenge to Communism, R.C. Dutt, Socialism of Jawaharlal Nehru (New Delhi: Shakti 
Malik Abhinav Publications, 1981), Rene Fulop-Miller, Lenin and Gandhi (Translated by F.S. Flint and 
D.F. Tait. London: G. P. Putnam‟s Sons, 1930), S.M Ganguly, Leftism in India: M.N. Roy and Indian 
Politics, 1920-1948 (Columbia, MO: South Asia Books, 1984), Marshall J. Getz, Subhas Chandra Bose: A 
Biography (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2002), Martin Green, The Origins of Nonviolence: 
Tolstoy and Gandhi in their Historical Settings (Happy Valley, PN: The Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1986), Makrand Mehta, “Gandhi and Ahmedabad, 1915-1920” (Economic and Political Weekly 
40(2), 2005: 291-312), William S. Metz, The Pollitical Career of Mohammad Ali Jinnah (Oxford 
University Press: 2010), and V.S. Patil, Subhas Chandra Bose: His Contribution to Indian Nationalism 
(New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1988). 
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gained guidance or inspiration from the emergence of the Soviet Union. Scholars in this group 
largely argue that the presence of the Soviet Union had a definite impact on nationalists‟ 
individual politics, and that it was largely unavoidable due to it taking up the opposite 
ideological position of the British Empire.
18
 They argue this fact sparked at least curiosity for 
some Indian nationalists, and led to further involvement by others. 
There is an abundance of work analyzing the well-known Indian nationalist leaders such 
as Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, along with others such as Manahendra Nath Roy 
and Subhas Chandra Bose. G.N. Dikshit writes in Gandhi’s Challenge to Communism that 
Gandhi recognized the appeal of communism for a colonial country such as India and the hope 
the new Soviet Union gave many Indians.
19
  He writes, however, that Gandhi found communism 
to be irreconcilable with India because of its lack of humanity, its lack of religion and 
individuality.
20
 Dikshit argues that while Gandhi had mass appeal, some of which overlapped 
with the mass appeal of communism, in reality Gandhi reached much of his political views 
independently and was as opposed to communism as foreign capitalist exploitation in India.  
R.C. Dutt‟s Socialism of Jawaharlal Nehru traces India‟s first prime minister and Gandhi 
protégé‟s socialistic influences.21 Dutt writes more how Nehru looked to the Soviet Union for 
inspiration rather than direction. For Nehru, there are both direct and indirect examples of the 
Soviet Union in his life as he visited and wrote about the USSR in the late 1920s. Nehru seems to 
have been more directly influenced early on however, as by the late 1930s Soviet leader Josef 
Stalin shifted Soviet policy and Nehru became less than inspired specifically by Soviet 
Communism than by the ideals of socialism. Specifically the ideas that continued to shape 
                                                 
18
 See Budhraj, “The Communist International and Indian Politics,” in B.R. Nanda, ed., Socialsim in India, and 
Zafar, “The Rise of Soviet Russia and Socialism in India, 1917-1929,” in Nanda, ed. Socialsim in India. 
19
 Dikshit, Gandhi’s Challenge to Communism, vi. 
20
 Dikshit, Gandhi’s Challenge to Communism, 100. 
21
 Dutt, Socialism of Jawaharlal Nehru. 
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Nehru‟s political outlook required non-violent and more egalitarian ideals than the reality of 
1930s Soviet Union.
22
 Both authors credit the Soviet Union with shaping at least part of Indian 
nationalist leaders‟ worldview. Some, like Gandhi, largely rejected what they saw, while others 
such as Nehru incorporated certain aspects into their politics. 
While the Soviet Union professed an ideological goal to spread the egalitarianism of 
communism for the benefit of mankind, perhaps its efforts in India were first and foremost a 
desire to weaken a rival global power. Regardless of what motivated the Soviet Union to take up 
interest in South Asia, real efforts in terms of funding, arms, and organizational capabilities to 
undermine British rule took place. B. R. Nanda‟s edited collection of essays Socialism in India 
includes articles dealing with the more direct role of the Soviet Union in Indian politics in the 
interwar years of 1919-1939.
23
 This collection grew out of a seminar convened by scholars of 
Indian history and socialism in 1968 and 1969 in Delhi. The attempt was to discern the origins of 
socialism in India and its lasting impact. The essay by Vijay Sen Budhraj entitled “The 
Communist International and Indian Politics” covers the years of early Soviet policy and their 
efforts to cultivate a functional Indian communist party.
24
 He argues that Indian communism 
struggled to gain a credible foothold in the colony. This was due to a combination of lackluster 
support for Indian communists, in part from Gandhi‟s overwhelming presence in Indian politics, 
and due to the Communist International‟s ever changing strategy for spreading global 
revolution.
25
 Another article by Zafar Imam within the same collection entitled “The Rise of 
Soviet Russia and Socialism in India, 1917-1939”26 situates the rise of the Soviet Union as 
influential for the full spectrum of socialism. Imam argues, however, that the influence was more 
                                                 
22
 Dutt, Socialism of Jawaharlal Nehru, 167. 
23
 Nanda, ed., Socialsim in India. 
24
 Budhraj, “The Communist International and Indian Politics,” in Nanda, ed., Socialism in India, 17-41. 
25
 Budhraj, “The Communist International and Indian Politics,” in Nanda, ed., Socialism in India, 40. 
26
 Imam, “The Rise of Soviet Russia and Socialism in India, 1917-1929,” in Nanda, ed., Socialism in India, 42-68. 
13 
 
from indirect ideological means than direct, coordinated efforts. The two authors agree on the 
disproportionate amount of British attention devoted to the topic than the reality in Indian 
politics warranted. This leads to the question of whether it just seems disproportionate in 
retrospect, or if perhaps British attention was effective at thwarting Soviet influence. 
 The third collection of research centers on the British Empire. There are several works 
pertaining to the interests of the British intelligence community in the colonies of the Empire. 
John Ferris‟s article “Tradition and System: British Intelligence and the Old World Order” and 
John Fisher‟s Gentleman Spies both seek to situate the role of intelligence gathering as it evolved 
in the British Empire.
27 
Both write about how the new technologies of the twentieth century 
revolutionized intelligence gathering in focus and organization. The biographic focus is not 
unique to Indian nationalists either, however.
28
 Fisher shows this through the personal story of 
N.N.E. Bray, an Indian Army officer and special intelligence operative who was very much a 
pioneer in tracking Bolshevism in India.
29
 Ferris‟s work shows that the intelligence community 
was forced to act differently after World War I than it had before. Through reading both in 
conjunction it becomes clear that the intelligence community was delving into something it had 
little experience with previously. It had to adapt to new technologies used for intelligence 
purposes. This gave intelligence agents copious amounts of information. The sheer volume lent 
the appearance of evidence supporting any number of suspicions leaders already had. It was the 
difficulties discerning volume from possible selective gathering practices that leads one to 
wonder if British paranoia altered how they constructed the political reality of India. An 
                                                 
27
 See Fisher, Gentleman Spies: Intelligence Agents in the British Empire and Beyond. 
28
 See David Carlton, Churchill and the Soviet Union (Manchester University Press, 2000), and Van Ree, The 
Political Thought of Joseph Stalin, for works on Churchill and Stalin respectively. 
29
 Fisher, Gentleman Spies: Intelligence Agents in the British Empire and Beyond, 107. 
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information overload of sorts could have led relatively inexperienced intelligence officers to 
misinterpret and over-assign value to reports and information received.
30
  
 The use of intelligence gathering and methods of analyzing and interpreting factor into 
the questions historians ask about the existence of empire. What are the goals of imperialism, 
what are the strategies employed to protect it, and how are those in power assessing the strength 
of their grasp on power? Piers Brendon spares no opportunity to retell British government 
officials‟ comparisons between the Roman and British Empires. The name of his book, The 
Decline and Fall of the British Empire is a play on historian Edward Gibbons‟ eighteenth 
century work The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.
31
  Together with authors such as 
Michael Silvestri and Linda Colley, Brendon‟s work seeks to re-label the era of the British 
Empire and imperialism not as one dominated by a confident, superior power but one that was 
operated by an insecure nation fraught with failings and conflicts, both within its colonies and 
within its leadership.
32
 There are works that include how the Bolshevik Revolution changed the 
landscape within the British government and how these efforts manifested in the colonial lands.
33
 
Common themes focus on the idea of empire such as its operations, roles, and lasting impact. 
Within that group is work such as that of Andrew Muldon which includes a section on 
intelligence collection, its effectiveness, and how it may have fed into pre-existing insecurities 
regarding imperial power.
34
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It will be necessary to stitch together conclusions made by historians researching these 
three distinct historical perspectives surrounding Soviet influence in British India. This will 
illuminate information collected by British Intelligence in India which documented Soviet 
influences and communist organizations within India in the interwar period. Ultimately 
conclusions can then be corroborated with primary sources generated by the documents and 
statements produced by Soviet, British, and Indian leaders. The sources included in this 
historiography are a diverse group. This diversity is the result of a requirement to look at three 
distinct interests: Soviet leadership and Marxism in general, Indian nationalists, and the British 
government. Diversity is also evident in methods used. Many authors use stories of individuals to 
illustrate the history of various topics. The works by authors such as Fisher, Ganguly, Dutt and 
Dikshit display the topics of British insecurity, intelligence, and Indian nationalism. Some use 
comparison, either between individuals such as Dikshit‟s Gandhi’s Challenge to Communism or 
between nations such as Neilson‟s Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles 
Order, 1919-1939. The contemporary events of a scholar also influence the questions they ask. 
This is displayed by work investigating socialist influences in Indian nationalists amid the height 
of the cold war, to reevaluating the effectiveness of intelligence and notions of empire decline in 
the post-9/11 world.  
The rhetoric of British leaders in the interwar period made it appear that Bolshevik 
conspiracies of overthrowing the capitalist world order were real possibilities everywhere. The 
British feared indirect Soviet influences in India through the success of a rival ideology which 
was inherently hostile to imperialism. The volumes of intelligence collected in India created the 
impression that Soviet-directed communists had infiltrated large segments of society. After all, 
the British tracked direct influences in the form of funding, arms, and communications not just 
16 
 
from Bolshevik communists, but from anyone with socialist leanings. These Soviet influences 
served to provide an ideological alternative and material support for India‟s nationalist leaders 
following World War I. An empire accustomed to being the dominant power feared the stigma of 
loss. These fears led to what appears to be paranoia, that is, the overly credulous appraisal of a 
threat. India in fact did not violently overthrow British rule before World War II despite some 
attempts, and even when it was granted independence, it was not a Soviet-led communist nation 
behind the Iron Curtain, but instead it became a fledgling democracy. 
Why then did the British believe Soviet involvement in India was so great? For one, there 
is credible rhetorical and material evidence that the Soviet Union did actively support 
revolutionary efforts in India. This evidence can be found in the many speeches and written 
works that came out of the Communist International. It was the origin of financial support, 
educational training, and even armament shipments tracked by British intelligence services. 
Marxism openly argues for the abolition of capitalism, and the establishment of the Communist 
International in Moscow provided the leadership for spreading communism abroad. Secondly, 
Indian nationalists expressed varying degrees of receptiveness and curiosity regarding the Soviet 
Union. From the British perspective, the potential for a mutually beneficial India-Soviet Union 
relationship existed. And thirdly, the British Empire‟s efforts to assess the threat in India were 
hindered by its ability to collect and analyze unbiased and reliable information. The intelligence 
community was subject to the influences of the Empire‟s leaders, who had an innate hostility 
towards the Soviet Union. It was also unable to collect and analyze all-encompassing 
information on political unrest in India, a nation of hundreds of millions. All told, the perceived 
ambitions of a young Soviet Union were a convenient explanation for the ills of an over-
extended empire. Rather than admit that colonial subjects of the Empire genuinely wanted 
17 
 
independence, the leaders of the British Empire arrived at the Soviet Union as an enemy to 
British rule in India not first out of evidence, but out of ideology. The presented evidence 
followed to fit the circumstances. 
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Chapter One: The Threat Emerges 
1917-1919 
 
The articulation of both national self-determination and the appearance of communism 
challenged the British Empire in India following World War I. The Soviet Union of the early 
interwar period based itself on Vladimir Lenin‟s unique brand of communism. This ideology was 
rooted in the theories first put forth by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Marxism is inherently 
hostile to imperialism, and so it is no wonder why the British were at such unease at the 
existence of a world power founded on such an ideology. 
 As of the previous century “a spectre [was] haunting Europe – the spectre of 
Communism” so declared Karl Marx and coauthor Frederick Engels in the Manifesto of the 
Communist Party of 1848.
35
 This document was the basis for the communist parties that would 
form in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries throughout Europe. It described the 
critiques of the capitalist world-order in mid-nineteenth century Western Europe and theorized 
the solutions to these critiques. Embedded throughout the Manifesto is language which implores 
the reader to take up the goals of communism, with violence when necessary. It is this 
combination of argued widespread injustice, destined progression towards a future of equality, 
and inspiration of revolutionary behavior that made the document such a powerful force in the 
years to come. 
Marx and Engels arrived at their theories through a linear study of history in which 
humanity continually develops and gains further liberties.
36
 It followed that the most developed 
capitalist societies would be the first to undergo a revolution of the proletariat. Great Britain had 
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been the first nation to industrialize and so had the most developed proletariat class. This helped 
explain Great Britain‟s ability to dominate the imperial competition between European nations in 
the nineteenth century. Classic Marxism follows that once a nation such as Great Britain, France 
or Germany underwent a workers revolution, the rest of the world would fall as dominoes. The 
proletariat class would export the revolution to lesser developed nations until the world was 
united under the banner of communism. The revolution thus would not be achieved on a 
nationalist platform, but a class-based one as workers of the world would unite.
37
 
 Under this order of revolution Russia should not have been the first communist nation 
due to the fact that it had one of the least developed industrial working classes in all of Europe. 
Great Britain had every reason to fear communism, but under the thoughts of Marx and Engels it 
should have originated in Britain.
38
 At the turn of the twentieth century Russia under the Czar 
was chiefly an agrarian economy. After 1905 it underwent democratic reforms but still had 
elements of the old monarchy intact. Russia was not only the wrong place for revolution in terms 
of its limited industrial proletariat, but its political system did not foster the type of guaranteed 
constitutional freedoms that a communist revolution would require. Institutions of a liberal 
democracy such as freedom of press, assembly, and protesting grievances would allow for a 
revolution of the masses to spread with minimal bloodshed and maximum legality.  
The caveat that would embolden followers of Marxism outside the most developed 
nations was a later admission by Marx and Engels. After witnessing the revolutions of 1848 
across Central Europe, they revised the original document and argued it could endure later 
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editions and amendments as the world changed.
39
 Although minor changes could be expected, at 
its core the Communist Manifesto would remain a relevant critique of capitalism. It is this 
acceptance of alteration that gave revolutionaries outside of Western Europe justification for 
their own applications for communism. It allowed Vladimir Lenin to introduce and lead the 
revolution to succeed in Russia. Long the back-water of Europe, suddenly the new Soviet Union 
was the leader of a new vision of the world. Great Britain did not have to fear revolutionary 
behavior from its domestic working class alone, but potentially the lower classes anywhere both 
home and in the colonies should Marxism establish itself as a global phenomenon. 
The established world order was officially on notice with the outbreak of the Russian 
Revolution in February of 1917.
 40
 Lenin‟s Bolsheviks were not the only Marxist‟s of the time, 
but their adherence to violence helped them become the strongest. Whereas other parties within 
the Russian Revolution remained willing to work within the existing political structures, Lenin 
constantly argued that the present was the only time for revolution.
41
 Lenin‟s Russia had only a 
short lived semi-democratic government and was one of the least developed economies in 
Europe. But he adopted Marxism to fit the conditions of Russia by introducing a peasant 
element. He led the Bolsheviks to take up arms, and with superior party organization and 
strategic ruthlessness was able to establish the first Marxist regime in the world by toppling one 
of the largest empires.
42
 If the British knew anything about Marxism they would naturally have 
asked themselves if a similar revolution was possible in Britain since it had just occurred in 
largely peasant Russia. 
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In a series of essays published while exiled from Russia in 1916, Lenin articulated how 
imperialism was the “highest stage of capitalism.”43 This imperial exploitation meant that the 
oppressed classes existed not only in developed western European nations, but that their rule 
over peoples across the globe represented the worst, most exploitative form of capitalism to date. 
It was partly on this explanation that Lenin and the Bolsheviks did not support Russia‟s 
involvement in World War I, what they dubbed “The Great Imperial War.” The shrewd leader 
that he was, Lenin effectively portrayed the Bolsheviks as caring not about territorial gains or 
nationalistic ideals but caring for the masses of workers. He was also able to sell Russia to fellow 
Marxists as just the beginning of a larger global revolution that was to follow. It was an historical 
guarantee according to Marx, perhaps just originating in an unexpected location and at a quicker 
pace than expected. 
 Lenin did not envision this class revolution beginning and ending in Russia. In fact, the 
grasp on power was precarious and Lenin was counting on reinforcements from foreign sources. 
While Lenin altered Marx‟s progression of revolution by starting it not in the most developed 
capitalist country, he nonetheless saw the importance to continuing the revolution‟s success by 
exporting it to these nations before it failed in Russia.
44
 The Bolsheviks were not just facing 
threats from other less radical Marxists, liberals, and conservatives within Russia, but foreign aid 
and armies supporting these efforts bolstered their opposition. Winston Churchill earned a 
reputation as being “the foremost Western enemy of the Bolsheviks during their struggle to 
consolidate their authority in Russia” as a member of the War Cabinet beginning in 1918.45 The 
West suspected that communism was inherently hostile to their present societies. Soviet 
revolutionary Leon Trotsky made this suspicion no secret as it was “the possessing classes, who 
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rightly sensed in it (the Communist Manifesto) their mortal enemy.”46 Fortunately for Lenin 
following World War I, most western nations were in no position to contribute substantively to 
opposition forces, and the Bolsheviks ultimately consolidated power and established the Soviet 
Union even as civil war and resistance continued for a few more years.  
 The establishment of the Soviet Union was supposed to prove to Marxists in Germany, 
France, and Great Britain that a communist state was in fact possible. The message was if a 
nation with such a poorly developed proletariat class could undergo a Marxist revolution, the 
nations of Western Europe with much larger numbers of industrial workers certainly could do the 
same. If the revolution ever was going to occur on a world-wide scale, however, it had to occur 
with these economies as the bulwark of communism. Lenin saw the Soviet Union as the trigger, 
or the weak link, in European capitalism. Russia was a country that was so economically 
backwards in comparison to the rest of Europe that not even capitalism had fully taken root. It 
was therefore thought that communism could be constructed on top of the existing village 
communes without an extended fight by a well-established bourgeois class that other nations 
pressed.
47
 Indeed once the Soviet Union was established, leftist parties across Europe and 
America began to grow and play a more prominent role in local politics. Leading Soviet 
revolutionaries believed the devastation across Europe following World War I would make it 
especially weak economically and susceptible to political revolution. The Soviet Union was in 
prime position to take up leadership on the matter. 
 The ideology of the new Soviet Union was openly hostile to the rest of capitalist Europe. 
Great Britain saw the danger posed by the Soviet Union and following the war assigned greater 
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resources to opposing it. This took the form of aid to anti-Bolshevik parties fighting in the 
Russian Civil War, but also intelligence collection on internal leftist organizations and external 
Soviet meddlings such as those in India.
48
 The Soviet Union took up responsibility as the first 
communist nation to cultivate and support the revolution abroad. Those potential revolutions‟ 
survival depended on this as much as its own. Its most immediate neighbor was Germany, a 
nation humiliated by defeat and burdensome reparations. Lenin and others in Soviet leadership 
made continued overtures towards Germany trying to make friends with the former foe.
49
 
The British Empire had just survived its greatest threat as World War I came to a close 
late in 1918. The trauma of war historically has a destabilizing effect on governments. This was 
one possible reason Russia experienced the political turmoil it did following the war with Japan 
in 1905 and throughout World War I. The Allies had defeated the Central Powers, but the war 
effort was aided in part with help from their many colonial possessions. This aid acted to soften 
the hit an economy such as Great Britain or France would have suffered through war-time losses. 
The British utilized strategic war-time materials such as oil from the Middle East, rubber from 
South America and Africa, and even soldiers from India. These lands had contributed greatly to 
the war effort, and in turn many in these lands hoped their “good” behavior would be rewarded 
following the war. The expectation was that “nothing remained to be done, it seemed, except to 
make ready for the transfer of power” explains one historian.50 However, the reality of 
continuing British rule quickly became apparent in places such as India. Britain‟s largest 
possession would not sit idly by and civil unrest began to rise. 
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The world looked on with anticipation to the post-war order that would emerge following 
the Peace of Paris in early 1919. Nationalist fervor was increasing in India with many patient 
Indian leaders expect concessions from the British government in exchange for the sacrifices and 
loyalty India displayed throughout the war. Entire regiments of Indian Sepoys fought along the 
western front on behalf of the Allies.
51
 As of 1919, units of Indians were in Iraq, Egypt, 
Palestine, and along the Back Sea under the British flag.
52
 Resources and capital had flowed into 
Britain throughout World War I contributing to Britain‟s ability to maintain its industrial 
capacity. Instead of increased autonomy, however, India was greeted with the Rowlatt Acts. This 
legislation restricted the civil liberties of Indians and was passed without input from the Indian 
National Congress.
53
 It appeared the British government hoped to gain a preemptive advantage to 
quell the unrest they knew they would provoke by further denying independence.  
 And provoke they did. During the summer of 1919 mass demonstrations began 
throughout the country. British military forces were far outnumbered in India with totals in the 
tens of thousands compared to India‟s population of hundreds of millions. The tension came to a 
head in what would be known as the Amritsar, or Jallianwala Bagh Massacre. With varying and 
conflicting reports at what exactly sparked the violence, the outcome was not in question. Armed 
soldiers were ordered to fire and maintain firing into an unarmed crowd.
54
 The crowd of 
thousands was trapped in an enclosed courtyard with only one escape route blocked by British 
soldiers. When the dust settled an estimated 1,200 had been shot and 379 lay dead.
55
 India was 
shocked at what had occurred. While the commanding officer was reprimanded for ordering his 
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men to fire, the discipline was decided in British courts, not Indian, a fact that added salt to the 
wounds.  
British rule was increasingly seen as an oppressive regime rather than a benevolent 
democracy. While the calming sentiments of Gandhi would greatly mute the violent impulses, 
from this point onward the option of maintaining a status-quo relationship with the British was 
off the table for the majority of Indian leadership. Politicians and the masses alike became more 
aware of the political environment of India in the post-World War I world, and the British 
resolved to rely on more clandestine operations to stay a step ahead of the growing political 
unrest in India. British rule in India was far from uneventful prior to this. Also, since 1885 there 
had been an Indian National Congress which pushed the British colonial government for Indian 
interests, though in reality it possessed little real power for much of its existence.  
The turn of the twentieth century saw the first rumblings of sustained Indian nationalism 
with the rise to prominence of Bal Gangadhar Tilak, called the “Father of Indian Nationalism.” 
His efforts earned him multiple prison sentences and helped lay the foundation for the growing 
nationalist sentiment that would follow. Through the years of World War I British control in 
India was firm despite differing effectiveness of various viceroys in charge of the Government of 
India. That began to change with the close of World War I in part because Britain‟s economy and 
military was at its weakest immediately after the war. They had been stretched thin from war. 
National self-determination contributed as a term colonial peoples increasingly used for 
justification of independence.
56
 The concept made British officials nervous as unrest mounted in 
India. 
 Perhaps one of the most endearing legacies the British left in their colonial lands was that 
of education opportunities. While far from universal and equitable, there was still large numbers 
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of Indians educated either in schools established in India or in the universities of Europe. There 
is no telling how important this would be for the Indian nationalism that would emerge. 
Individuals educated as doctors, lawyers, or members of the civil service would go on to become 
the intellectuals and leaders of the nationalist movement. These were people who had experience 
within the bureaucracy of the government. Many were convinced they could govern on their own 
as well, if not better than British foreign to India. The British policy of developing an Indian 
ruling class of civil servants contributed to the nationalist fervor.
57
 These indigenous leaders 
were better equipped through education and experience to fight the system they saw as 
oppressing their peoples. An educated civil service class gradually formed in India since the 
British took firm political control in 1857. The western liberal philosophy many were taught was 
not inherently racist and allowed Indian leaders to stand toe-to-toe intellectually with leaders in 
the British government. The racial superiority many British officials assumed only stood to 
embolden their nationalist opponents, and perhaps prevented British leadership from accurately 
assessing the growing strength of the movement. 
 The key leaders of India‟s nationalist movement all were Western educated. Men such as 
Mohandas Gandhi, the intellectual leader of the movement, Jawaharlal Nehru, who would 
become the first prime minister of India, and Mohammad Ali Jinnah the first prime minister of 
Pakistan all attended universities outside of India. This invariably introduced an element of 
foreign influence in the Indian independence movement. Some of India‟s most prominent 
nationalists where exposed to not only classic western democratic views, but that of Marxism 
while in Europe.  
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The socialist influences some picked up in the west were not necessarily entirely new to 
India either. Author V.S. Patil argues that elements of socialist philosophy were reminiscent of 
sentiments in the ancient Sanskrit texts of the Bhagavad Gita, and of Buddhism and Jainism 
which preach the lessons of justice, liberty, equality, happiness, and welfare. Patil also argues the 
scripts from the ancient Sanskrit Vedas “breathe the spirit of socialism.”58 Of course it could also 
be strongly argued that similar sentiments in western history tracing back to the bible exist as 
well. The Indian revolutionary Subhas Chandra Bose once said “the new ideas of socialism are 
nowadays traveling to India from the West, and so they are revolutionizing the thoughts of many, 
but the idea of socialism is not a novelty in this country. We regard it as such because we have 
lost thread of our own history.”59 At the very least it is a factor to consider why various Indian 
nationalists had known socialist sentiments. It may also partially explain why the British 
assigned so much weight to threats to their power. It may have caused the British to suspect 
potential influence from the Soviet Union being heard by a receptive audience. 
The first two decades of the twentieth century saw India‟s nascent nationalist movement 
start to grumble. The British had slowly been creating in India a government which incorporated 
democratic elements. For nationalists educated in the west this did not pose much of a problem. 
For the most part they saw western democratic governance as the most just the world had yet 
seen. If only the same principles of popular participation and self-rule were applied in their 
homelands there would be much less of a problem. This ideal was complicated with the 
establishment of the first Marxist regime in the world. With the creation of the Soviet Union, a 
curiosity about success or failure of an entirely new system would develop. Nehru explained in 
April of 1919 that “today the spectre [of Communism] has materialized and is holding the 
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Western world in its grip – What is this spectre, this new spirit which is conquering the peoples 
of Europe and America and yet is so bitterly opposed and maligned by the men in authority?”60 
Now those hoping to instill a new government in India had a different model to consider. A 
western education would have meant India‟s leaders had already an understanding of Marxist 
thought. 
From the British perspective, a perfect storm was forming in India to foment revolution 
following World War I. The growing educated middle and upper classes in India were becoming 
aware of what national self-determination could mean for India. For decades Indian leaders had 
to contend with the British justifications that increased democracy would come when India was 
ready. The hypocrisy of British rule was apparent in that they believed in democracy, yet denied 
it to millions of people. Now with ideas of national self-determination abound Britain had yet 
another philosophical debate with which it was on the wrong end of.  
With India laying just an Afghanistan away from the Soviet Union, and the historical 
context of the Great Game taking place the past century, the British Empire saw a serious threat 
mounting both geographically and ideologically.
61
 India was arguably the most important of 
Britain‟s overseas colonies in terms of the vast wealth of resources its size represented. Russia 
was also the traditional rival of Great Britain to the northwest of the subcontinent. While the 
British may not have feared a Russian conquest of India as much, they knew the blow it would 
be to their empire to lose India. A Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, once explained “…neither 
Russian statesmen nor Russian generals are foolish enough to dream of the conquest of India, 
they do most seriously contemplate the invasion of India; and that with a very definite purpose 
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which many of them are candid enough to avow.”62 The purpose he inferred being to strike at a 
base of wealth and resources for a rival such as Great Britain. India had historically been a 
“central bastion” of world power, as former British officer turned writer Olaf Kirkpatrick Caroe 
wrote.
63
 Internal unrest was growing in India, and a potential major external threat was emerging 
from the core of Eurasia. It is from these considerations that a newly focused eye turned towards 
political rumblings that could have had influence from the Soviet Union in India following 
World War I. 
The bigger threat in the eyes of the British lay in the stated goals of the new Soviet 
Union. An untested ideology opposed to the very capitalist system that had brought Britain its 
empire now occupied a major world power. This power had a self-espoused goal of spreading its 
revolution across Europe and the world. The “Red Scare” that swept across Great Britain was fed 
by the growth of the British Communist Party and the increase in organized labor in the late 
1910s and early 1920s.
64
 The British government had perhaps no more vocal leader regarding the 
Soviet threat than Winston Churchill. He was particularly alarmed at domestic connections 
between British citizens and the Soviet Union.
65
  Churchill had a history of foreign relations 
and/or military posts in the British government entering this period, and of course would 
continue to be major voice for decades to come. He served as Under-Secretary of State for the 
Colonies from 1905-1908 and Minister of Munitions from 1917-1919 within the War Cabinet. 
As early as November 1918, on the eve of the Treaty of Versailles that would cripple Germany‟s 
new democratic Weimar Republic, Churchill advocated building up the German army for fear of 
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the spread of Bolshevism.
66
 It appears that while the rest of Europe wanted to avoid another arms 
race with Germany that led to the most destructive war yet seen, Churchill was more concerned 
with containing a Bolshevik regime that had withdrawn from war. Churchill obviously saw more 
long-term danger in a group of Marxists than a fully industrialized Germany. 
The Soviet Union did not try to ease the minds of its European neighbors regarding its 
international goals. It went as far as creating an entity dedicated to the cause of international 
communism. The aptly named Communist International was formed in March of 1919, with the 
first meetings held March 2-6. The duties of the Communist International, or Comintern, were to 
“establish a common fighting organ for the purpose of maintaining permanent co-ordination and 
systematic leadership of the movement, a centre of the communist international, subordinating 
the interests of the movement in each country to the common interest of the international 
revolution.”67 The Communist International thus performed an array of tasks relating to 
spreading the revolution. This organization operated independently of any Soviet elected body 
and most of the Communist Party structure. The only body it answered to directly was the 
Presidium of the Soviet Union, its highest institution.
 68
 See Appendix A. It is also interesting to 
note that German was the official language of the first congress considering where the Soviet 
Union intended the revolution to go in next.
69
 
 Grigory Zinoviev, one of the initial members of the Communist International, wrote in 
the founding document that “our task is to generalize the revolutionary experience of the 
working class, to cleanse the movement of the disintegrating admixtures of opportunism and 
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social patriotism, to mobilize the forces of all genuinely revolutionary parties of the world 
proletariat and thereby facilitate and hasten the victory of the communist revolution throughout 
the world.”70 It is by its very nature why the British Empire took interest to its actions and why 
leaders such as Churchill were right to suspect the Soviet Union of subversive activities. 
Following World War I Western European economies were devastated. Existing governments 
were the weakest they had been since the Napoleonic Wars. The first red scare was sweeping 
across Europe and the United States. Unionization was at its highest mark in history and left 
leaning parties were making inroads throughout the international community. The optimism 
within Soviet leaders was at a peak as expectations were abound of Germany falling to 
communist sentiments within months.  
If Gandhi could be assigned as the intellectual leader of Indian nationalism, then Lenin 
was the intellectual leader of the communist revolution. His statues still dot the Russian 
landscape and its former Soviet republics. He dominated the shaping and formation of the Soviet 
Union during the early years. At the opening of the First Congress of the Communist 
International on March 2
nd
, 1919, it was he who delivered the opening remarks.
71
 In this short 
speech he mentioned workers movements in Germany twice, saying “comrades, our gathering 
has great historic significance. It testifies to the collapse of all the illusions cherished by 
bourgeois democrats. Not only in Russia, but in the most developed capitalist countries of 
Europe, Germany for example, civil war is a fact.”72 He would go on to include Great Britain 
too, showing immediately the two nations where the desire to spread revolution was greatest. 
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Lenin spoke confidently of the continued success and spread of the communist revolution 
abroad. He stated that “the bourgeoisie are terror-stricken at the growing workers‟ revolutionary 
movement” and that the “the imperialist war inevitably favors the workers‟ revolutionary 
movement, and that the world revolution is beginning and growing in intensity everywhere.” 
Lenin closed his remarks by stating “victory will be ours, the victory of the world-wide 
communist revolution is assured.”73 It is key that Lenin referred to the First World War as an 
imperialist war, demonstrating the terms in which Marxists viewed the world. 
 The platform of this first Communist International holds nothing back in its language or 
its stated intentions. First is “the conquest of political power,” which it explains as “the 
annihilation of the political power of the bourgeois.”74 Second to conquest is “democracy and 
dictatorship,” an interesting relationship those two seem to have under the Soviet ideal. It is 
interesting that the platform notes:  
Like all states, the proletarian state is an instrument of repression, but it is directed 
against the enemies of the working class. Its purpose is to break the resistance of 
the exploiters, who use every means at their disposal in the desperate struggle to 
drown the revolution in blood, to make their resistance impossible. The 
dictatorship of the proletariat, which openly gives the proletariat a privileged 
position in society, is however a provisional institution.
75
 
 
 These are the terms in which Soviet leaders thought and this sort of promised temporal limit 
gave them license to commit whatever acts necessary to ensure the success of the revolution. It is 
this kind of rhetoric that left outsiders convinced there would be no peace with a communist 
regime. 
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Europe was worn out from war by 1919. The people and economies needed recovery. No 
one was in much of a position to aid the conservatives and moderates in the Russian Civil War. 
The United States was ramping up production across the Atlantic, but offered no immediate 
threat to the new Bolshevik regime. Political parties in Great Britain experimented with leftist 
ideals, the Labour and Socialist parties in particular. The Communist International debated on its 
affiliation with organizations such as these as hard-liners within the revolution had always 
condemned more moderate Marxists as friends of the liberal-democrats and threats to the 
strength of revolution. Using these conditions as opportunity the Soviets sought to fortify their 
power throughout the new Soviet state and further the cause of revolution. The Communist 
International worked to exploit the clear inequalities and failures of the capitalist system brought 
to the forefront by the war. Weak capitalist economies also gave the Soviets fodder for 
propaganda purposes among the industrial working classes, further solidifying a quickly 
centralizing state. These conditions left Soviet leaders convinced that the world was ripe for their 
brand of Marxism, both economically and politically, and that it would happen soon.  
Bearing in mind the post-war economic climate of Europe with the Marxist-Leninist 
theory of communist revolution, it seemed that a workers revolt to rise up in nations across 
Europe was plausible. Lenin recognized that the Soviet Union‟s chances for survival increased 
greatly if there was another communist nation to absorb some of the world‟s attention. Official 
documents of the Communist International voiced concern that soon enough “the danger that the 
alliance of capitalist States will strangle this movement.”76 Western Europe had a much more 
robust working-class. Lenin figured if he could convert Russia, Western Europe‟s combined 
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populations of workers and peasants should have been able topple their governments more easily 
than it had been in Russia.  
Lenin had proclaimed that victory was assured. The ideal timeline therefore was 
shockingly short. It started out with numbers being counted in the months, six or nine before the 
first nations would fall, namely Germany followed by Great Britain.
77
 When events did not go 
accordingly, timelines were altered to meet current conditions. Almost always the new estimates 
were in the short term, within a year or two. Only with the death of Lenin and almost a decade 
passed with no global revolution did the Soviet Union begin to reevaluate its expectations. 
Considering the harsh rhetoric and events coming out of the Russian Revolution, the British had 
no reason to take the Soviet Union lightly. Certainly this aura of hostility came to play when 
determining intelligence resources. This expectation of communist revolt in effect led to the 
biased selection of information. The British knew the rhetoric coming out of the Soviet Union. 
This meant intelligence regarding it or any socialist-leaning development was open to being 
preferentially selected and followed. Considering an enormous colony such as India experiencing 
nationalist protests, the intelligence with Marxist connections would have stuck out like a sore 
thumb. 
 A natural outgrowth of the colonial relationship was a superiority complex within British 
leadership. It gave rise to a very paternal mind set. The British operated on the premise that they 
knew best, and so ultimately any concessions to the natives would occur on their own 
prerogative. Officer Olaf Kirkpatrick Caroe would argue in 1918 that self-government in India 
had to rest on the local foundation. It would have to be representative of the people of India, but 
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the people would have to be “qualified,” which meant a “proper political education.”78 Indians 
felt themselves intellectually equal with the British as more would travel to Britain and attend 
universities. There was, generally speaking, nothing inherently racist in western philosophy. 
Many Indians agreed that the British governmental system was one to be emulated, just that the 
individuals themselves were overbearing and disrespectful. It was a very alienating and 
condescending mindset, something more and more Indians would lose patience with following 
Wilson‟s Fourteen Points after World War I. The common explanation the British utilized to 
ward off talk of Indian independence was that the British were simply preparing the Indians for 
self-rule. They could not turn over a nation as large and diverse, with deep religious and ethnic 
differences and expect it to be a seamless transition. Instead the British explained that democratic 
ideals and governance takes time in implementing. The British had for instance allowed the 
Indian National Congress to exist since 1885. It was growing in prominence, and had been 
developing a large Indian civil service class to run the affairs of India. 
The skeptic could also explain these actions as running an empire on the cheap. Indians 
occupying bureaucratic positions were cheaper than importing British citizens. Besides, all the 
most important power wielding positions were occupied by British. Gradual concessions that 
lead to some increasing roles for Indians were pointed to as evidence that the British were 
making good on their promises. Minor concessions also served as a stick and carrot proposition 
to continue to entice Indians to peacefully cooperate with the colonial relationship and ward off 
the British from having to relinquish power for the foreseeable future. Following World War I 
the British began running out of excuses for restricting further liberties. Rather than satisfy their 
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subjects‟ demands they began turning towards more insidious methods of intelligence gathering 
to gain the upper hand and quell unrest. 
Indians living in India were not the only ones drawn to the socialism of the Soviet Union. 
Rajani Palme Dutt is worth mention in that he would become the leader of the Communist Party 
of Great Britain (CPGB). Dutt was half Indian, the son of an Indian doctor living in Great Britain 
and a Swedish mother. He experienced frequent racism growing up and it is suspected this 
influenced his early political thought. Racism caused him to gravitate towards leftist anti-
imperialist ideals that focused on class rather than nationality or ethnicity.
79
 Dutt was arrested for 
refusing military service after being drafted in 1916, though he may not have been allowed to 
participate in the British army anyway due to his mixed race. Shortly after the Bolshevik 
Revolution he became active in a pro-Communist International faction of the CPGB. Though he 
was the “least” Indian among the nationalist leaders discussed his ancestry tied him to 
developments in India. “He was, arguably, the most important figure in the Communist Party of 
Great Britain” and was “Moscow‟s most trusted lieutenant in Britain.80 It was a post that 
invariably brought him into contact with issues regarding revolutionary developments in 
Britain‟s colonies. If being a leading member of Britain‟s communist party was not enough to 
concern officials, his Indian ancestry certainly raised the stakes. It is an example of the British-
Indian-Soviet relationships that only contributed to Britain‟s concern of Soviet influence in 
India. 
This pro-Communist International support would show Dutt‟s revolutionary potential. He 
advocated direct communist revolution under leadership from the Soviet Union rather than a 
gradual advocating for workers rights within British law. His loyalty to the Communist 
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International is perhaps derived from its position on colonial issues, a “matter of „race‟ 
equality.”81 He also subscribed to the belief articulated at the Second Congress of the Communist 
International that the colony was an “economic drain” in relation to its ruling country.82 This 
meant that an empire‟s colonies could be used as a tool for revolution. A history of being a 
radical and his Indian ancestry made him particularly noteworthy from the British government‟s 
perspective. 
By 1919 the Bolsheviks had established a new order in Russia. Jawaharlal Nehru 
expressed the opinion that perhaps western newspapers were not telling the whole truth about 
Bolshevism. He mistrustfully wrote that “there must be something deeper, something more worth 
having in these various issues than the newspaper accounts would leave us to believe.”83 Despite 
things being reported as anarchy caused by the Bolsheviks, Nehru speculated that there was more 
to the movement that had driven a revolution, a non-nationalistic one at that. The words 
emanating from the Soviet Union thus on the one hand were explicitly hostile to the British, 
while on the other beginning to incite curiosity in a young Indian nationalist movement. The 
dangerous combination was not lost on Churchill who was reprimanded in late 1919 by his 
superiors due to his “obsession” with Russia. It is reported to have led him to neglect his other 
duties and irritated British Prime Minister Lloyd George.
84
 As the decade came to a close the 
British Empire was dealing with unrest in its chief colony and facing an ideological enemy the 
likes of which the world had never seen. The two were separate at this point, but as the political 
situation in India continued to deteriorate, the stated goals of one increasingly were matched with 
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the results in the other. The information leaders relied on was subject to preconceived notions of 
who the enemy was. In a nation where sheer size made comprehensive political information 
collection next to impossible, it was prioritized and analyzed in an environment subject to the 
biases of the popular opinion of its superiors. The British were weary of Bolshevik conspiracies 
throughout their empire. 
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Chapter Two: The Height of the Scare 
1920-1925 
 
Is the story of Manabendra Nath Roy that of one of the most interesting men in world? 
As far as Indian nationalists go he was never the force in Indian politics that Gandhi or Nehru 
were, but as far as ties to the Soviet Union Roy is front and center. He was born as Narendra 
Nath Bhattacharya in Urbalia, Bengal in 1887. At the age of fourteen he joined the anti-British 
revolutionary movement in Bengal. From World War I on his travels in pursuit of this goal 
would take him across the world; from Burma to Indonesia, China, Japan, the Philippines, the 
United States, Mexico, Germany, and finally the Soviet Union all before returning to India by 
1930. It was in the United States that Roy would first discover Marxism in the mid-1910s. While 
in the US he was arrested, jumped bail, changed his name to evade British intelligence, met a 
recent Stanford graduate whom he would later marry, and escaped to Mexico. There he founded 
the Mexican Communist Party, the first communist party outside of the Soviet Union.  
Roy would soon be invited by Lenin to Moscow in 1920 to participate in the Second 
Congress of the Communist International. This first appearance left quite an impression on Lenin 
as he was able to get some of his writings incorporated into the Congress‟ decisions.85 Roy 
would become the Head of the Eastern Section on the Presidium of the Communist International 
and travel to Germany and China to train and then help direct efforts abroad. The delegates of the 
Second International now included representatives from outside the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe. Roy recalled part of the allure of the event as one in which “nearly all the languages of 
the world were heard in the streets of the Soviet capital. For the first time, brown and yellow men 
met white men who were not overbearing imperialists but friends and comrades, eager to make 
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amends for the evils of colonialism.”86 International party members felt much more included 
being treated on an equal plane than many in the colonies had felt in dealing with European 
leaders.  
Roy attended representing the Mexican delegation, as an Indian party had yet to form. 
While in attendance he sparred with Lenin in discussions about the goals and strategies of the 
Communist International. By citing Lenin‟s 1916 work Imperialism, the Highest Stage of 
Capitalism, Roy argued that bringing down the most developed capitalist economies in Europe 
would be made easier by depriving them of their profit source, i.e. their colonies.
87
 Roy had 
impressed the delegates with his intellect and knowledge of Marxist ideology. His truly global 
vision for communism was well received by the Congress. While in attendance Roy wrote an 
alternative draft of a thesis on the national and colonial question originally written by Lenin. 
Roy‟s version expressed his opinions on the usefulness of depriving Europe of its colonies as the 
utmost importance and thus even moderate nationalist organizations should be supported. The 
Congress decided to approve both versions after “Lenin created a sensation by declaring that 
prolonged discussion with me had made him doubtful about his own Theses; therefore, he 
proposed that both drafts should be considered together.”88 While inclusionary, this example 
helps explain the Comintern‟s sometimes conflicting directions throughout its existence. Lenin‟s 
thesis asserted that the Communist International should recognize differences in “bourgeois-
democratic” movements, with some being revolutionary and others merely “reformist.” The 
reformist efforts would not attempt a makeover of the economic order of society and so were not 
worthy of Soviet support.
89
 It is after this convening of the Communist International that the 
                                                 
86
 Manabendra Nath Roy, M.N. Roy’s Memoirs (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1964), 348. 
87
 Roy, M.N. Roy’s Memoirs, 381. 
88
 Roy, M.N. Roy’s Memoirs, 381. 
89
 Haithcox, Communism and Nationalism in India, 11. 
41 
 
Soviet Union would at least consider devoting resources towards nationalist movements in the 
east that were not strictly Marxist. 
Locations of Soviet interest now included China, Persia, and India. Individual cases 
would be considered whether these movements were dominated by communists or more 
moderate nationalist movements on the belief that revolt would weaken their colonial rulers. It is 
on this point, the nature of the nationalist movement, which would create the most friction within 
the Communist International into the future. One on which Lenin, Roy and others did not always 
see eye to eye as a useful expenditure of resources. One such dissenting voice was Soviet 
Presidium member Nikolai Bukharin who urged support of even the most outright nationalist 
movement if “it contributes to the destruction of English imperialism.”90 The argument over 
spreading the world revolution vs. solidifying the position of the Soviet Union is one that would 
cause many to fall victim to Stalin‟s purges as party members with a past of supporting non-
communist or non-revolutionary organizations. 
While Roy represented Mexico at his first Communist International appearance, 
establishing a Communist Party of India would be one of the first objectives upon leaving the 
Second Congress. Largely through the influence of Roy, a revolutionary training school with this 
goal in mind was opened in Kabul, Afghanistan “somewhere about 1920” by him and Abani 
Nath Mukherji as named in intelligence reports.
91
 See Appendix B. Some of those trained there 
were Muhajirin,
92
 a portion of whom subsequently went on to courses in the Eastern University 
in Moscow. Shortly later the school was moved further north to Tashkent as to not explicitly 
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offend the British as much as such a training school on their border with India would have. The 
Moscow training “ultimately became the more popular of the two and the Tashkent school was 
closed several years ago...” as of 1930.93 Just one year into the Communist International 
significant attention is shown to have shifted to efforts to the east, training and educating 
revolutionaries with an eye towards India. 
While leaders within the Soviet Union debated the merits of supporting strictly 
communist causes vs. anything that weakened European capitalism, the British sought to stem a 
strain of each: nationalism in India and a growing Marxist movement at home. Speaking on the 
role of the communist party in global revolution during the second congress Lenin quoted 
remarks and debates with English “Comrades” Tanner and McClain.94 These were officials in the 
British Labour and British Socialist parties respectively.
95
 In just over a year we see the role of 
the Communist International expand into a truly international entity. One speech by Lenin was 
even dedicated to the debate about affiliations the International would have with the British 
Labour Party.
96
 What this meant for Britain was that its growing socialist population, the more 
radical elements to be specific, came to see their own nation‟s colonies as deserving of 
independence as they increased contact with the Communist International. The British 
government largely dismissed this sentiment as a traitorous element under the influence of the 
Soviet Union rather than internal opinion turning against their own empire. It set the stage for a 
showdown of sorts “in the contested ideological battleground that was 1920s India.”97 These 
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connections between the Soviet Union, socialists in Britain, and socialists or nationalists in India 
came to be a major focus of suspicion for British intelligence efforts. 
Following Winston Churchill‟s time as Minister of Munitions from 1917-1919, he served 
as Secretary of State for War and Air from 1919-1921 and Secretary of State for the Colonies 
1921-1922.
98
 His speeches and positions within the British government display an adamant 
distrust on all things Bolshevik, describing it as “the subversive movement of socialism.”99 
Churchill‟s concerns were not limited to the Soviet threat in a war-weakened Europe however. 
He suspected the new Soviet Union had eyes for Britain‟s colonies and India in particular 
commenting on January 2, 1920 in some metaphorical language that: 
 We may abandon – the Allies may abandon – Russia. But Russia will not 
abandon them. The ghost of the Russian bear comes padding across the immense 
field of snow. Now it stops outside the Peace Conference in Paris, in silent 
reproach at their uncompleted task. Now it ranges widely over the enourmous 
countries which lead us to the frontiers of India, disturbing Afghanistan, 
distracting Persia, and creating far to the southward great agitation and unrest 
among the hundreds of millions of our Indian population, who have hitherto lived 
in peace and tranquility under British rule.
100
 
 
Considering the Amritsar Massacre had occurred within the last year the end of that statement 
could not be more untrue. It displays the type of public denial British officials appeared to be in 
regarding the independence movement in India. Churchill seems to chalk up Indian unrest to 
nothing more than the provoking behaviors of a northern neighbor. He was not the only 
Englishman to view the Bolshevik regime of the Soviet Union with such contempt. Russia, as 
many still referred to the new Soviet Union, was described as “the enemy of civilization” 
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according to N.N.E. Bray, an Indian Army Officer and special intelligence officer.
101
 Bray would 
conclude by 1920 that intercepted messages between Moscow and a Soviet agent in Kabul, most 
likely linked to the training school established by M.N. Roy, suggested that “Soviet 
propagandists had already penetrated India….these reports offered conclusive proof of 
Bolsheviks attempts to establish a „Soviet India.‟”102 Bray‟s influence was felt as his report 
“Bolshevik Intrigue” was circulated to the Cabinet by Secretary of State of India Edward 
Montagu in June of 1921.
103
 And indeed a number of documents within the Indian Political 
Intelligence gathered were titled “Bolshevik” or “Communist Intrigue” as addressed to superiors 
within the intelligence community.
104
 
 For as much as the Soviets pushed the envelope and adhered to their own agenda, outside 
forces inevitably would affect Soviet policy both in terms of reactions against events and 
opportunities to be seized. Following World War I European economies were devastated. The 
Central Powers of Germany and Austria were hit even harder by the overwhelming burden of 
war reparations decreed they pay in the final peace treaty signed in Paris in 1919.  Lenin spoke 
highly of the communist parties developing in Germany. He saw Germany as the next domino to 
fall due to its proximity to the Soviet Union, its deplorable economy, and even perhaps its 
outrage over Allied decreed reparations. As part of the propaganda the Communist International 
would release was sentiment such as “there is not a single healthy spot in Europe. Economically, 
Germany has been thrown back for decades.”105 The only real benefactors of these realities were 
the United States, who was left unscathed by the horrors of war, and the newly formed Soviet 
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Union, who otherwise might have faced the hostilities of stronger neighbors for adhering to such 
a threatening ideology. 
As 1920 wore on the initial optimistic predictions of Germany undergoing a communist 
revolution within months appeared less and less likely. Facing the failure of rapid revolution in 
Europe left the party‟s top thinkers scratching their heads at what went wrong. The United 
States, despite having some initial socialist rumblings in the form of early labor strikes and 
violent putdowns, flourished under its capitalism and pledged to help rebuild Europe through 
loans. Great Britain recovered from war fairly quickly as it sustained minimal damage. Its 
political system experienced Marxist sentiments and its unions grew, but the reality was that any 
kind of revolutionary sentiment was pacified by relatively minor concessions extended by 
government and management. Its proletariat class appeared to lack that revolutionary character 
Marx believed was required and the leadership to bring the class awareness Lenin believed.  
With prospects to the west of the Soviet Union looking increasingly bleak, some began to 
ponder how else to reach the robust industrial workers of the continent. That is when voices such 
as Roy gained more influence within the Communist International. The thought was to attack 
Europe ideologically where it is weakest, where its imperialism is the highest stage of 
capitalism.
106
 The influence of Roy could be seen as the words of the Communist International 
focused more on imperialism and the peoples of the colonies than the previous year. The tone of 
Lenin shifted quite severely in the Second Congress. Gone is the unbridled optimism and assured 
victory, and also gone is the clear focus on Europe. In his reports on the international situation, 
Lenin opened by discussing the sheer volume of people oppressed in the colonies of the five or 
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six greatest “most civilized and free” democratic and capitalist nations in the world.107 He does 
this to underscore the masses living under seeming hypocrisy, something that could and should 
be exploited for the benefit international communism. This shift is one that will continue as the 
revolution in Europe did not spread as rapidly, or at all, as once believed it would. 
 While it was true that Europe had the most industrial workers, its capitalists were also 
firmly in control. World War I had shaken this grasp, especially in Germany, but European 
capitalism was clearly stronger than expected. The answer for some in the Communist 
International lied outside of Europe; remember however that this was an organization with 
international membership. It began to be argued more based on “Lenin‟s pamphlet on 
Imperialism, published just before the War broke out in 1914,
108
 [it] maintained that colonial 
expansion reinforced the foundation of the bourgeois order in Europe and delayed its inevitable 
downfall according to the prophecy of Karl Marx.”109 In other words, Europe‟s economy had 
been propped up long before the war from its vast colonial possessions. 
 The colonies of Great Britain, France, even Germany continued to siphon capital into 
Europe. Regarding India in particular “the plundering of the country‟s great natural wealth is 
English imperialism‟s chief source of power,” so declared official Comintern memoranda.110 
This saving grace is in partly why Lenin dubbed imperialism as the highest stage of 
capitalism.
111
 The war had not cost Europe‟s major powers their colonies, though President 
Wilson‟s proclamations of national self-determination did resonate strongly in the colonies of the 
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world. Perhaps it was here that the grasp on the colonies first began to truly weaken. Great 
Britain certainly feared this and saw the most compelling action in this direction in India 
following World War I. Dubbed the Great Imperial War by Soviet leaders, World War I was a 
watershed moment in the history of colonial rule. And while the colonies perhaps saved 
European capitalism in the face of the communist threat from the Soviet Union, they also would 
grow to become a major headache in the years to come. India was not alone in experiencing 
nationalism as movements arose in the Middle East, Turkey, and China. 
 So in what perhaps was an ironic twist of fate, the strength of capitalism in the eyes of the 
Soviets was also its weakness. While the colonies propped up Europe, they also represented a 
possible weakness in their political structure according to Soviet thought. They were a 
hypocritical weakness that could be exploited. The growing classes of educated in the colonies 
saw the self-pronounced strength of western nations in democracy. Their home colonial 
countries could not become the best they could without their own democracy, their own 
independence. These discrepancies were something the Soviet Union could exploit, with their 
own communist tinge on matters. 
A new hope of the Soviet Union for spreading communism into the colonies would be 
that a communist overthrow in India would give the Soviet Union a strong ally to second its 
claim of communism being the future and would irreversibly damage its former ruling country, 
Great Britain.
112
 The seeds of communism would then grow up into the working classes of the 
home country while still experiencing pressure exerted directly by the Communist International. 
At the very least it was an alternate model for the global revolution to begin.
113
 Perhaps this was 
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merely a desperate attempt to apply the teachings of Karl Marx. Had revolution followed in this 
manner it would have been the opposite of what Marx believed was the way for communism to 
develop. Soviet leaders however could not bear to admit that the doctrine in which they had been 
fighting under had been wrong. Besides, what did it really matter the order or means as long as 
the final product was the same?  
The Soviet Union believed it had a reasonable chance of success in the colonies for a 
number of reasons. Local populations already had resentment towards their imperial rulers. 
Nationalist tendencies were already beginning to boil over in some places. Leaders argued since 
Russia was heavily a peasant society going into the revolution, the Soviet model could be better 
applied to the colonies than to the economies of Western Europe. Peasants would form the 
backbone of a communist overthrow of the colonial government. This would begin the process 
of communist revolution on a global scale, and weaken the economies of Europe‟s more firmly 
entrenched and developed capitalist economies. 
Perhaps the most visible link demonstrating the Soviet Union‟s influence on Indian 
politics was through the Communist Party of India. The party was officially recognized by the 
Communist International in 1921, though at this time it was based in Tashkent, Uzbekistan and 
not in India.
114
 It took guidance from the Communist International in Moscow regarding labor or 
consumer strikes to support or reject, levels of cooperation that should be undertaken with other 
Indian socialist factions, and efforts to unite all Indian socialists under communism. The party 
would struggle to effectively establish itself in India, but at least as early as 1921 an entity 
proclaiming its aims of communist revolution for India existed. The fact however that leaders 
such as Churchill were on record as saying the Soviet Union was directly influencing unrest in 
India and that officials within the Government of India received reports of “Bolshevik Intrigue” 
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in India, and yet there was not even a communist party established within the nation of hundreds 
of millions testifies to the extent that Soviet rhetoric had raised the perceived threat in India 
without much in terms of substantiated intelligence and a vocal Indian communist leadership to 
prove it. In the coming years intelligence on Soviet influence within India would dramatically 
increase, but how much of it is because actual Soviet activity increased, and how much of it was 
because the British focused on it at the detriment of other intelligence gathering? 
During these early years of the 1920s British intelligence had been keeping tabs on left 
leaning organizations, from trade unions to the Communist Party of Great Britain and efforts to 
establish a party in India. Churchill would also be moved from the War Cabinet to the Colonial 
Office in February of 1921. No longer did his duties put him in direct responsibility of the Soviet 
Union, where he had been coordinating anti-Bolshevik efforts as during the three years of 
Russian Civil War that broke out following Bolshevik consolidation in 1918. But now the 
Empire‟s most vocal opponent of the Soviet Union was involved in colonial policy. It is naive to 
think he would not have brought his prior suspicions and hostilities with him to his new position. 
Other British leaders though would echo much of the sentiment of Churchill as Secretary of State 
for India Edwin Montagu in June of 1921 spoke in terms bordering on panic regarding the 
“immediate threat from the Russian Bolshevik regime.”115 While India experienced nationalist 
agitation for independence, leadership continually had an eye on any kind of foreign Bolshevik 
influence. 
British intelligence did not just have its hands full at home, but abroad too. The 
government of India generated an “astounding amount of paperwork: correspondence, reports, 
circulars, censuses and all matter of other supervisory documents.”116 Not only were intelligence 
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officials expected to keep up with collecting new information, but to assess and analyze it too, a 
“Herculean task, one that distracted local officials from cultivating potential sources, and often 
resulted in the production of reports that were pro-forma.”117 Interwar intelligence gathering did 
nothing to lighten this load, and that continual reports “could not help, therefore, but be selective, 
reductive and even unintentionally misleading…the Government of India did not possess the 
manpower, funds or legal sanction necessary to carry out a full-scale operation of surveillance 
and infiltration of the nationalist movement.”118 What this meant is that intelligence operations 
had to be selective. Certain groups or individuals whose activities were seen as more “seditious” 
were prioritized because larger scale nationalist marches or mass meetings were more difficult to 
cover and thus pinpoint responsibility.
119
  This meant that “much of this intelligence was 
fragmentary,” and had to be stitched together by overworked British officials.120 The conclusion 
of an understaffed intelligence agency that had to consider priorities, together with very strong 
anti-Soviet rhetoric within British government, and anti-colonial rhetoric from the Soviet Union 
must have played a role in what caught the attention of intelligence officers. This could explain 
the disproportionate amount of attention spent on communist intrigue in India considering its 
impact in retrospect. 
The Indian Political Intelligence (IPI) was a division within the India Office in London. It 
was the agency employed to assess the political situation in India, and while it was officially 
created before World War I (1912), the number of documents regarding Soviet influence saw a 
serious jump by 1922. It was supported and fed information from the Intelligence Bureau in 
Delhi, various Criminal Investigation Departments of each province, and the British domestic 
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agency New Scotland Yard.
121
 IPI information would be transmitted to London to the Foreign 
Office for analyzing. It was along these avenues of communication that the British assigned 
varying levels of threat, connected dots, and determined what action would be necessary to take. 
Indian Political Intelligence collected information on all things politics in India, and had 
extensive records on various degrees of left leaning movements, whether they be broadly 
socialist or specifically Marxist.
122
 These files included notes if they were independent Indian 
communists or had ties to the Soviet Union. Intelligence findings built cases incriminating 
various individuals. The names that appear in various files attest to that as Gandhi, Nehru, Roy, 
and Bose all make at least cameo appearances, and in the case of Roy, major roles indeed. 
 The Indian Political Intelligence Files represent a treasure trove of documents detailing 
the surveillance efforts the British government in India utilized on spying on any possible threats 
to their rule. The number of documents total in the thousands, and to underscore the degree to 
which they targeted communist and direct ties to the Soviet Union specifically, entire sections 
have been organized and collected regarding “Russia” or the communist parties of Great Britain 
and India.
123
 See Appendix L. These files include reports on various goings on in India between 
the decades of the 1920s and 1930s. Some examples of the many files are intercepted telegraphs 
between various trade and labor unions in India, and either their counterparts in England 
suspected of having connections with the Soviet Union, or with Moscow itself. Soviet sponsored 
banks figure largely into the equation here, along with remittances sent between individuals and 
organizations across international lines. Along with money, arms were also tracked, probably the 
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two most important parts of supporting a revolution. Other examples of Soviet intrigue were 
documented by the IPI, including training schools in Central Asia and Moscow. Strategic 
resources too as Soviet oil and British distribution of oil had extensive coverage. The examples 
included here are just a small taste of a very interesting and robust collection of intelligence 
information that shows the types of details the British were able to track in India, and gives 
insight into the information British leaders would have been privy. 
Among the earliest IPI reports on Soviet influence it was reported that over 120,000 
pounds sterling had passed through M.N. Roy‟s hands by November of 1922. The report 
speculated however that much of the money was pocketed by intermediaries and terrorist groups 
who were more interested in Russian money than Comintern politics.
124
 The Indian Political 
Intelligence files also include evidence that the British were aware of direct Soviet efforts to fund 
banks and trade unions sympathetic to socialist organization both in Great Britain and in India. 
Just one example is in a document explaining that “further details have come to light as the result 
of inquiry into sixty-three Bank of England pound notes…which have been traced to India. It is 
now certain these note came into India via Kabul, and it seems equally certain that that they 
arrived at Kabul via Moscow and the Kabul Soviet Legation.” 125 See Appendix C. This evidence 
would point in the direction of a money-laundering type scheme where these organizations 
would then funnel the money to more direct political organizations with the aims of fomenting a 
socialist or communist revolution in India. The monies here most likely would have originated 
from the Communist International and its proceedings in Moscow. These documents reveal the 
mounting evidence the British collected regarding direct involvement, and would have confirmed 
prior suspicions.  
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 It was not just underground counterfeit operations being traced to Moscow, but there 
seems to have been a legitimate side of things. The establishment in India of branches of the 
State Bank of the USSR is discussed in letters exchanged between British officials. One such 
letter refers to a local branch opening in Bombay, and described it as an “agency” of the Soviet 
bank.
126
 See Appendix D. Such agents of the Soviet Bank apparently had been tracked in other 
cities in India and back into London as well. British officials saw growing connections between 
financial institutions at home and in its colonies to a state operated bank from Moscow. The 
banks have “been kept under secret observation from time to time since the signing of the Trade 
Agreement with Soviet Russia,
127
 as the transactions of the Soviet Government in this country 
appeared to show that they were using their accounts in these banks to for the purpose of 
financing revolutionary movements here and in the colonies.”128 See Appendix E. It did not take 
a leap of faith to draw conclusions that such institutions were not just banking enterprises but 
avenues to fund and support local trade and union organizations, in addition to any suspected 
communist organizations the British would have believed to be in existence. A number of IPI 
files track remittances, funds sent across international boundaries between individuals or 
organizations. In this case they were used to pinpoint sources of Soviet intrusion into banking or 
political organizations. 
Increasingly the Soviet Union represented more than an ideological threat, but was 
actively supporting destabilizing and potential revolutionary organizations. It is difficult to assess 
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how successful the British believed these Soviet attempts were. As there was limited success at 
fomenting communist revolution early in the 1920s, stemming results seems to be far less of a 
concern than confirming intentions. Intentions were all the British needed. After all, they had no 
way of knowing for sure if they knew the extent of the Soviet presence in internal Indian affairs. 
The indirect connections between Indian nationalists and the Soviet Union was largely 
something the British could not limit as most of it was ideological alternatives to the British 
system. The prominence of the Soviet Union brought knowledge of the ideas it was founded on 
to a wider global audience simply through newspaper reports, travel and word of mouth, and 
visibility. This sort of influence is evident in some of the writings and speeches of various Indian 
nationalist leaders. But what the British could prevent, or at least assess with some certainty, is 
this sort of direct assistance emanating from within the Soviet Union. Perhaps this is fed into the 
psyche of the British official that Bolshevik conspiracies were everywhere, but for a world 
power wanting to maintain control over its empire, the collection of this intelligence filled a gap 
of direct linkings between the two that never could be proved regarding the indirect means. 
The Communist International for its part continued to convene and issue documentation 
addressed to governments and organizations outside of Europe. A good deal pertain to China as a 
fledgling struggle between Chiang Kai-Shek and Mae Zedong was underway in the 1920s. Some 
other examples include a letter sent to the Indian National Congress in December of 1922.
129
 It 
implores the Congress to order the releases of a number of young Indians who had been arrested 
following training at the military school in Tashkent and at the University for Toilers of the East 
in Moscow, stating that “the ferocity of this judicial murder is unsurpassed even in the bloody 
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history of British rule in India.”130 Yes, apparently such an institution existed under that name. 
The letter then goes on with some fairly strong language, probably doing more harm to their 
cause than good. It states that “British rule can and will be overthrown only by a violent 
revolution” and says that the peaceful path preached by Gandhi would end in failure.  
In a debate regarding eastern potential the Communist International described the actions 
of the west following World War I as forgetting “their promises and turned with fresh and 
unexampled force to the throttling of India, the robbing of China, the division of Turkey, and the 
enslaving of Persia...Remember that in this selfless struggle you are not alone.”131 By ending 
with a pledge of support, the Soviet Union is displaying at least in rhetoric that it is not only 
concerned with Europe, but the entire world. Time and time again the British hear stated hostility 
to overthrow their rule all the while they gathered information confirming Soviet intentions. The 
British had the motivations correct, and the existence, it is the magnitude of influence that may 
have been overstated as the result of erring on the side of caution. For a government under-
funded and under staffed in India, it would have distracted from assessing the larger threat to 
their rule, that of genuine homegrown Indian nationalism. 
Churchill‟s feelings of Moscow certainly did not disappear and it is not a stretch to 
imagine this influenced policy in the Foreign Office. He spoke of foreign agents penetrating the 
British government, subverting society, and plotting to take over the world. Then in 1924 
information came to light which seemed to vindicate the suspicions of many. The Daily Mail in 
Britain published a secret letter supposedly penned by Gregory Zinoviev, the head of the 
Communist International, addressed to the Communist Party of Great Britain instructing them to 
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push for the ratification of the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement and to establish cells within the 
British army. The letter reads “it would be desirable to have cells in all units of the troops, 
particularly among those quartered in the large centres of the country, and among factories 
working on munitions and at military store depots.”132 This bombshell of a letter went on to say 
“it is indispensable to stir up the masses of the British proletariat to bring into movement the 
army of unemployed proletarians...”133 The Zinoviev Letter as it would come to be known even 
mentions the colonies, offering assistance that “the I.K.K.I. (Executive Committee, Third 
International) will willingly place at your disposal the wide material in its possession regarding 
activities of British Imperialism in the Middle and Far East.”134 This evidence put on display for 
all the British public and leadership that surely would prove the active, deliberate Bolshevik 
conspiracies that many had suspected. The threat also confirmed was not just at home, but in the 
colonies too. There is one problem with this seemingly irrefutable proof however, the letter is 
now know to have been a forgery.
135
 
The letter served short term electoral benefits to the majority Tory Party in the British 
Parliament, but also long-term vindication for those who refused to accept the Soviet Union as a 
menacing entity that was there to stay. It raised the stakes for warding off the growing tide of 
communism, and strengthened the questioning of loyalties at home. Regarding the socialists in 
Great Britain Churchill said that “the socialists can think of nothing but Moscow. They look 
upon it with admiration, almost adoration…My objection to the Russian loan is not alone on the 
grounds of prudence or profit; it has also been based upon moral grounds.”136 He remained on 
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edge regarding Britain‟s colonies, and focused on the threat to Great Britain itself describing the 
prospects of the Soviet Union as follows:  
Behind Socialism stands Communism. Behind Communism stands Moscow, that 
dark, sinister, evil power which has made its appearance in the world – a band of 
cosmopolitan conspirators gathered from the underworld of Europe and America 
– which has seized the great Russian people by the hair of their heads and holds 
them in a grip, robbing them of victory, prosperity, of freedom. This plaguish
137
 
band of conspirators are aiming constantly to overthrow all civilized countries and 
reduce every nation to the level of misery to which they have plunged the great 
people of Russia. They strike everywhere, by every method, through every 
channel which is open them, but there is no country at which they strike so much 
as this island of ours.
138
  
 
At the Fifth Congress of the Communist International in 1924 India was again mentioned 
as a place where the “constitutional illusions and hopes of reconciliation among the enslaved 
masses are fading.
139
 Representatives of foreign communist parties increasingly played larger 
roles at these congresses. Some interesting names appear in its annals, with one Ho Chi Minh 
addressing the organization in 1924.
140
  The Indian portion of the communist party still struggled 
to gain traction. Actual membership in the Indian Communist Party is difficult to ascertain as 
was reported only 78 members comprised its initial formation in 1925.
141
 One member did not 
know whether to “laugh or cry.”142 But various labor unions with membership in the tens of 
thousands could be claimed as communist leadership by supporters of Marxism in India. 
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 The ideological reasoning behind turning east was shaky at best according to classic 
Marxism, but the practicality was not. Though the east did not have the established industrial 
working classes that communism was supposed to have been founded upon, it did provide a safe-
net of sorts for maintaining the strength of European capitalism. The Soviet Union also was not 
attempting to introduce Marxism into lands completely devoid of an education on the subject. In 
India there was growing awareness of socialism simply through young Indians who had the 
luxury of a European education by means of their connection with Britain. Young nationalist 
leaders looked to the Soviet Union in its first decade of existence with an optimism that a 
positive alternative to colonial rule had formed in Europe, one which was ideologically friendlier 
to colonial nations such as India. The British knew that communism threatened their colonial 
holdings on ideological grounds. As the IPI files have shown, they also had collected extensive 
evidence that the Soviet Union was actively seeking to foment communists in India. Where the 
greatest threat came from they were not sure, but knew the tangible efforts by the Soviets would 
be easier to combat than that of the idea. This was something they could not do with the growing 
nationalist sentiment in India.
143
 The assistance of the Soviet Union was something that could be 
stopped if that was indeed what was fomenting Indian dissent. Preventing feelings of Indian 
pride and desire for independence was largely out of British control. 
The nation and colony began developing a relationship of mutual interest. The Soviet 
Union continued its turn towards colonial lands such as India as an avenue for spreading 
communism, at least in rhetorical support, while India saw in the Soviet Union a system which 
would allow it to exit the imperial world system. While to varying degrees this relationship never 
came to fruition, it alarmed the British nonetheless who saw their role in India under attack from 
these separate interests. The main question the British had was how could they stop these trends; 
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Indian nationalism, and Bolshevik communism? The thought that the two could and were 
combining terrified the colonial office to the point that it set up a specific agency to track it. For 
most Indians, independence was of paramount concern. What would allow it to occur swiftest, 
with greatest chance of success, or with least bloodshed? If there was a possibility communism 
could do this it would be discussed. Leaders such as Gandhi and Nehru would educate 
themselves on the topic and thought about how it would apply to India. 
Gandhi, the largest presence in the nationalist movement had sympathetic statements on 
the concept of communism. For anything to rise to prominence during independence it would 
need Gandhi‟s blessing. For Jawaharlal Nehru, seen by many as Gandhi‟s apprentice of sorts, 
communism, or at least socialism in some form was very appealing. This was especially true 
early in the nationalist push when the idealism of Lenin‟s young Soviet Union had yet to be 
largely spoiled by Stalin in the years to come. For others such as Manabendra Nath Roy, an 
actual member of the Communist Party, the Soviet Union represented a range of possibilities 
regarding the future of India. Despite the ultimate failure of Soviet style communism in India, 
leftist influences were abound throughout the nationalist movement and were seen by the British 
to explain their own loosening grasp on the country, see Churchill‟s previous statements tying 
unrest in India to the Soviet presence to the north.
144
 
Although Gandhi was not the founder of Indian nationalism, he was far and away the 
largest figure in it. His experiences and understanding with socialism were formed throughout 
the experiences of his life as socialism in practice came to develop throughout Gandhi‟s lifetime. 
Born in 1869, he was educated as a lawyer in Great Britain before becoming a civil rights lawyer 
in another British possession; South Africa. Already as a young man Gandhi had accumulated 
experience living in three different places around the world; India, Britain, and South Africa. 
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During subsequent years in South Africa he began to develop quite a reputation for defending 
Indian rights among the large Indian migrant community there. Gandhi was not always 
advocating for the ouster of the British either. He was loyal to the British government during the 
Boer War in South Africa of 1903-4. But the longer he fought for the rights of the people, the 
more outspoken he realized he needed to be to make real change.
145
  
What began emerging out of his work as a young lawyer were his philosophies on non-
violence. He utilized words such as satyagraha, or truth-force, and began connecting sentiments 
of what it means to be Indian with expanding political rights. It began to sound nationalistic, and 
is one of the reasons his stature continued to grow despite his shy personality and polite 
demeanor. Early in his career he was not known as a particularly skilled lawyer, but he garnered 
respect for his philosophies among Indians and British alike. English publicist Percival Landon 
said “Gandhi is more than a religious revivalist and a holy man, he is a Mahatma, to whom 
almost divine attributes are ascribed; there is no one like him in the word today.”146 As the 1910s 
progressed Gandhi took up cases not just involving Indian rights but worker‟s rights and rural 
interests, as often they were one in the same. It is here Gandhi would have the most exposure to 
socialist sentiment and application during the operation of his Tolstoy Farm community in South 
Africa-another interesting Russian-Indian connection.
147
  
As World War I came to a close and violent outbursts of Indian nationalism came with 
the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre, Gandhi saw a void in leadership. By 1920 Bal Gangadhar Tilak 
had passed away and the title of leader for Indian independence was open. Gandhi came to 
assume leadership as the de fact leader of the Indian nationalist movement. Regarding the new 
ideology that threatened the British so much, Gandhi recognized the appeal communism had for 
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a colonial country such as India and the hope the new Soviet Union represented for many 
Indians. What leaders such as Gandhi and others saw in the new Soviet Union is a nation that 
denounced the practice of imperialism and had deep roots in socialism. That stance alone would 
be enough to garner the curiosity of outsiders regardless of their understandings of communism, 
both its theory and its practice and methods.  
The most important Indian nationalist leader to actually spend a good deal of time and 
status and effort into considering the Soviet model for India was Jawaharlal Nehru. India‟s first 
prime minister and Gandhi protégé had definite socialistic influences in his politics. Nehru came 
out of an elite background. His father, also an influential voice in Indian politics, brought him up 
with a liberal western education. He attended Trinity College in Cambridge where he received a 
degree with honors in the natural sciences. He spent additional years in London studying for the 
bar until becoming a lawyer in 1912. Nehru had showed an interest in politics early on, having 
expressed criticism and impatience of moderates in Indian politics. Chiefly, he disliked the 
continual pledges of loyalty to the British crown.
148
 Learning liberal thought, Nehru saw a clear 
contradiction between the freedoms associated with western government and the imperial British 
rule in India.  
He was first and foremost a nationalist at this point, as he would largely remain so 
throughout his life. His time in Cambridge exposed him to socialist ideas, “but it was all very 
academic” at this point.149 And Nehru, unlike Gandhi, never really had the strong religious 
sentiment. Upon leaving London he relocated to Allahabad and worked under his father at his 
law practice. During the following years Nehru continued to see himself as a nationalist purely, 
but socialist ideals kept speaking to him in the back of his mind. He would go on to write that “I 
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am a socialist and a republican, and am no believer in kings and princes…”150 While far from 
stating he is a Soviet communist, he at least includes the word socialist. It is an indication such 
left-leaning affiliations were becoming more prominent and accepted in everyday politics. 
Rajani Palme Dutt, the British communist with Indian ancestry, helped lead the British 
party from the 1920s into the 1960s and was as well read inside the communist world as out. He 
would “become the principle link – between the Communist International, the Communist Party 
of Great Britain, and Communist parties in many parts of the British Empire – notably the Indian 
subcontinent.”151 The Fifth Congress of the Communist International after all had “devolved 
responsibility to the CPGB” regarding India.152 And although he supported these movements 
ideologically, Dutt was not an Indian citizen and so the real influences from the Indian 
perspective lies elsewhere. His main concern was in his home, Great Britain. Here is an example 
of someone who saw socialism as a possibility in India, supported and was partially involved 
with it, but never made it his chief point to sell it to the people there. 
As the midway point in the 1920s passed, the mutual interest between the Soviet Union 
and India continued to develop from the beginning of the decade. Though Nehru had expressed 
distrust at western reports of the Bolsheviks in 1919, he had yet to garner any first-hand 
experience on the topic. Indian nationalism was undergoing its own ebbs and flows with Gandhi 
continuing his rise to prominence. Others with stronger ties to communism and India such as 
Dutt and Roy had minimal impact within the nation itself. During this time the Soviet Union was 
more explicit with its intentions for the East, and India specifically. Its leaders voiced support for 
growing sentiment there and the Communist International increased efforts in the form of 
funding and rhetoric. In the larger picture however, the very basic step of establishing an Indian 
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Communist Party within the borders of India had still failed. The British, who knew from the 
start the Soviet Union was an enemy of capitalism, reassigned much needed resources within 
their intelligence services to assess the strength of the Soviet influence in India. While they 
gathered evidence proving what they suspected to find, they also displayed a priority to the 
communist threat over that of the much larger Indian nationalist movement in general. The 
Empire‟s efforts to explain unrest increasingly relied on intelligence that was focused on external 
threats rather than internal developments. 
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Chapter Three: Interest and Disinterest 
1926-1943 
By the latter half of the 1920s British intelligence services were in full swing. The Soviet 
Union had been working to establish a communist party and support trade and labor unions for 
over five years. The Communist International however had lost Vladimir Lenin in 1924, one of 
its biggest supporters. Stalin began to emerge at the center of the Soviet power vacuum while 
other founding revolutionaries and believers of the importance of international communism lost 
influence, and some, their lives. Even while the beginning of this period saw the Soviet Union 
lose its degree of interest in India, the processes that alarmed the British and caused the 
preferential treatment of Soviet intelligence in India was building off previous years. British 
intelligence had established leads, knew names, and had followed the money trail. These 
developments did not just dry up, and so the flow of Soviet incriminating evidence continued. 
For Indian nationalists, the early 1920s acted as a period to educate themselves on the Soviet 
Union as well. For surely somebody the British hated so much was worth their curiosity. As 
leftist groups made their first initial inroads in India, the Marxist ideology began to catch the 
attention of some of the most prominent leaders.  
Into the mid-1920s Churchill continued to speak out against the motivations of the Soviet 
Union. Despite India still failing to form a single communist party, and no other European 
nations falling to communism, Churchill continued to be on edge, referring to the Bolsheviks as:  
Those miscreants who have ruined their country are powerless in their efforts to 
ruin ours. In their plans of word revolution they find this island an obstacle. If 
they could only pull down Britain, ruin its prosperity, plunge it into anarchy, and 
obliterate the British Empire as a force in the world, they are convinced that the 
road will be clear for general butchery, followed by universal tyranny of which 
they will be the head, and out of which they will get the profits.
153
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Winston Churchill had lost none of his ill-will towards the Soviet Union to say the least. He 
would write in 1927 to Lord Birkenhead, the Secretary of State for India, and suggest that a sub-
committee be formed to examine the “menace” to India, referring to the Soviet Union. It is 
unclear the degree to which the British were aware of internal developments in the Soviet Union, 
and so from their perspective the mounting intelligence on influence in India only continued to 
rise. 
It would not be until later in the 1920s that prominent leaders such as Gandhi and Nehru 
would articulate their opinions on communism and the Soviet Union. Gandhi would in fact 
comment upon it a great deal. In a 1926 piece in an Indian newspaper Gandhi writes that 
“socialism is a beautiful word, and so far as I am aware, in socialism all the members of society 
are equal-none low, none high.”154 At another time Gandhi even says “I may tell you that I am 
trying my best to live up to the ideal of Communism in the best sense of the term.”155 Gandhi 
recognized the appeal to the masses such a doctrine would have, and suggests that the ideal of 
communism is worth emulating. Already however this could be interpreted as a slight at the 
Soviet Union. Perhaps being the only communist nation, it was not living up to the best sense of 
the term. 
A philosophy such as communism which abolishes private property could have been seen 
by Gandhi as truer to the human experience. He goes on to write “non-possession is allied to 
non-stealing. A thing not originally stolen must be classified as stolen property if we possess it 
without needing it.”156 Put in this way communism appealed not just politically, but morally too 
as it advocated not living beyond one‟s means. Gandhi was known for his minimalist ways, in 
                                                 
154
 Mohandas K. Gandhi, Towards Non-Violent Socialism, ed. Bharatan Kumarappa (Ahmedabad: Navajivan 
Publishing House: 1951), 9. 
155
 Gandhi, Towards Non-Violent Socialism , 157. 
156
 Gandhi, Towards Non-Violent Socialism, 12. 
66 
 
attire, in food, in lifestyle. The concept of equal distribution of wealth could be seen as 
something Gandhi could apply his philosophies to. It would mean “each man shall have the 
wherewithal to supply all his natural needs and no more…A society based on non-violence 
cannot nurture any other ideal. We may not perhaps be able to realize the goal, but we must bear 
it in mind and work unceasingly to near it.”157 It is precisely that idealism which intrigued 
Gandhi about the Soviet Union. It is why it would not have been a stretch if the British saw this 
interest develop into a more serious relationship between their largest colony and a chief rival. 
The Soviet Union was, if nothing else, a grand experiment in idealism. 
What these quotes do not do however is suggest that Gandhi believed it was the role of 
any form of government to prescribe such egalitarian goals. While Gandhi‟s personal philosophy 
may have had similarities to that of the idealism of communism, Gandhi nonetheless interacted 
with and worked on behalf of individuals of diverse political beliefs and personal backgrounds. 
While advocating peaceful resistance to British rule Gandhi was financially supported by 
wealthy industrialists. He drew “heavily on the business elite and urban professional groups for 
his mass movements and constructive programmes.”158 Surely peaceful Indian independence was 
the chief concern to Gandhi, not social revolution. He was not one to impose his will on others, 
merely lead by example. If the wealthy supported his efforts, so be it, Gandhi was not one to 
exclude. If he felt uncomfortable supporting something, rather than eliminate opposition he 
would remove himself as he did from the nationalist movement for a time in the 1920s. This 
decision resulted from the major moral qualms about being associated with a movement that 
experienced increased violence and deaths. Gandhi refused to be a part of that. 
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Gandhi ultimately found the communist manifestation of socialism in Russia to be 
irreconcilable with India for a number of reasons. Some of the biggest reasons lie in the seeming 
split between words and actions in the Soviet Union. For Gandhi, the means of achieving a goal 
were just as important as reaching the goal itself. If it could not be achieved humanely, it would 
permanently tarnish the goal and make the end result no better than what was being protested. He 
cites the Soviet Union‟s lack of humanity; specifically that “the needs of the spirit have to be 
kept in view along with the needs of the body.”159 This obviously does not meld well with the 
atheistic trends in Marxism. Throughout Gandhi‟s writings are justifications based on the 
preservation and cleansing of the human soul, of spirituality, and of God. While Gandhi was 
educated in the West he most certainly was spiritually grounded in the East. Religion continued 
to be of paramount importance in India. 
 Other specific differences exist between Gandhi‟s political philosophies and those of 
communism, and that fact should be clear so as to not overstate the Soviet Union‟s impact on 
Indian politics. Some include communism‟s assertion that the main driving force in history has 
been economic, that of property and production. Gandhi believed more in what can be described 
as a holistic-spiritual approach. Love for fellow human beings was the instinct which drove 
people, a love-force. This leads to non-violence, as “any record down to our own time we shall 
find that man has been steadily progressing towards Ahimsa (non-violence)…it follows that it 
has to progress towards it further.”160 Another sticking point to which Gandhi would never make 
concession to is use of violence as a tool. Lenin believed that the ends justified the means, 
something made clear with the violent tactics such as the Red Terror and the formation of a 
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secret police force employed to ensure the continuing revolution in Russia.
161
 Since the means of 
achieving a goal were everything to Gandhi, he withdrew his participation in the national 
movement after violence failed to cease on the part of protestors and British officials alike. 
Gandhi stopped his involvement and later accepted a six year prison sentence, effectively 
removing himself from national politics for the time. 
Gandhi and his ideas had mass appeal, some of which overlapped with the mass appeal of 
communism. In reality however, Gandhi reached much of his politics independently and was as 
or more opposed to communism for India, especially its Soviet manifestation, as he was to 
British rule. This reality however does show that while not all nationalist leaders had strong 
socialist connections fed by the Soviet Union, they were still operating within a political 
environment that required them to consider and comment on the political possibilities 
represented by the Soviet Union. Even in the rejection of the Soviet Union, a leader such as 
Gandhi was forced to contend with supporters and sympathizers of the Soviet Union such as 
Nehru, and frame his reasoning to rebuff what he saw as faulty with that ideology. All of this 
occurred in the context of leading an independence movement against Great Britain, and so any 
talk of alternative government reeked of political unrest and would have raised the suspicions of 
the colonial government regarding the Soviet Union. 
Jawaharlal Nehru‟s story is linked closer to that of the Soviet Union than Gandhi. He was 
much more openly socialist leaning than Gandhi too and looked to the Soviet Union for 
inspiration much more directly. With Nehru, there are both direct and indirect examples of the 
Soviet Union in his life. His journey to Moscow first took him to places across Europe such as 
Venice, Switzerland, and Berlin in 1926. These trips served both to make acquaintances with 
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Indian political exiles, but also to connect with political organizations sympathetic to Indian 
independence.
162
 He would go on to visit and write about the Soviet Union by 1927.
163
 This trip 
immediately followed his attendance to the International Congress Against Imperialism held in 
Brussels, Belgium earlier that year where he represented the Indian National Congress. The 
future Prime Minister soon after wrote about his visit to Moscow in a series of sixteen short 
articles published in The Hindu, an Indian nationalist publication, in 1928. 
The articles covered a wide range of topics from Nehru‟s impressions of the Soviet Union 
at the ten year anniversary of the Russian Revolution,
164
 to explaining the Soviet system,
165
 to 
various social institutions in Russia such as education, criminals, and peasants.
166
 Describing 
Russian women Nehru writes, “whatever other failings of the Russian women of today may 
have, she is certainly not a chattel or plaything of man. She is independent, aggressively so, and 
refuses to play second fiddle to man.”167 Such comments must be kept in mind to consider the 
audience Nehru was writing for. It would have been a largely Indian audience curious about the 
society of not just this alternative to British rule, a “great experiment” as he and others have 
called the Soviet Union, but this remaking of social the relationships that developed as a result. 
He explained this innate curiosity as follows: 
It is difficult to feel indifferent towards Russia, and it is still more difficult to 
judge of her achievements and her failures impartially. She is today too much of a 
live wire to be touched without a violent reaction, and those who write about her 
can seldom avoid superlatives of praise and denunciation. Much depends on the 
angle of vision and philosophy of life of the observer; much also depends on the 
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prejudices and pre-conceived notions which he brings to his task. But whichever 
view may be right no one can deny the fascination of this strange Eurasian 
country of the hammer and sickle, where workers and peasants sit on thrones of 
the mighty and upset the best-laid schemes of mice and men. 
 
For us in India the fascination is even greater, and even our self-interest compels 
us to understand the vast forces which have upset the old order of things and 
brought a new world into existence, where values have changed utterly and old 
standards have given place to new… If we desire to find a solution for these 
problems we shall have to venture along new avenues of thought and search for 
new methods…Russia thus interests us because it may help us find some solution 
for the great problems which face the world today.
168
 
 
Nehru knew the majority of India knew little of the Soviet system. If he was to influence 
a future for India to move in the socialist direction of a style of governance, it would not have 
been useful to demonize the Soviet Union, the world‟s lone socialist nation at the time. To 
assuage common fears of Russia, Nehru writes “Indians have been told for generations to fear 
Russia and it is perhaps a little difficult to exorcise this fear today. But if we face the facts we 
can only come to one conclusion, and that is that India has nothing to fear from Russia.”169 
Nehru here is competing with the very loud British voices in India that paint a very one-sided, 
dark picture of the Soviet Union. It was a rivalry between the British and the Russian Empire 
going back to the Great Game over influence in Central Asia since the early 19
th
 century. 
Nehru did not completely ignore the negative, however, but when he did acknowledge 
the dark sides of Soviet Russia, he generally tip-toed around some of the more unforgiveable 
realities. Regarding the often violent political purges Nehru writes that “the Soviet Government 
has a special and a ruthless way of treating its political opponents and all those whom it may 
suspect of counter-revolutionary activities. The humane principles of the general criminal law 
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are not supposed to apply to them as they are considered to be the enemies of society.”170 The 
word „special‟ most likely referred to executions or exiles to Siberia of class enemies by the 
Soviet government. Nehru‟s comments on the Soviet Union are insightful for they show at the 
same time a curiosity for communist Russia as a distrust of a past of British skewed history. For 
many the Soviet Union still represented an alternative to the British, whom they had bad 
experiences with in the past and with the Soviet Union they were mistrustful of its portrayed dark 
side. 
Subhas Chandra Bose is perhaps the most oriented with violence of the Indian 
nationalists. He was also relatively young. Born in 1897, Bose would have been barely twenty by 
the time of the Russian Revolution. Again the educated background is evident as his father was a 
respected lawyer in Eastern India. Bose too went to college, both in India to Calcutta‟s 
Presidency College and later at Cambridge to qualify for a position in the Indian Civil Service. 
He soon became bored of that however and with the rise of Gandhi following World War I 
became much more interested in politics.
171
 But whereas Gandhi could be seen as placing in the 
conservative side of Indian nationalism, Bose took to the left-wing socialist side.  
Like Nehru, Bose‟s socialism though was not directly Bolshevik as he explained 
“socialism today has different complexions and therefore different connotations when used by 
different people…to some people, again socialism is synonymous with communism.”172 He rose 
to prominence later than Gandhi, or Nehru and made his first mark in 1928 when he co-founded 
the radical Independence for India League with Nehru. Nehru at the time was a self-avowed 
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socialist; though spoke in milder terms often than Bose. Also like the other nationalists Bose 
served jail sentences on different occasions, eleven times is all.
173
  
Mohammad Ali Jinnah was a leading Muslim leader in British India during the 
nationalist movement. He went from being a leading advocate of unity to one of the founders of 
the separate state of Pakistan. It was quite the political transformation. Jinnah had been an active 
leader in the Indian National Congress since 1906. Like many of his colleagues he was an 
esteemed lawyer, educated in Great Britain, and a stout secularist. In 1916 he served as a legal 
counsel for B.G. Tilak during his sedition trial. Jinnah was instrumental to reviving the Muslim 
League in 1924 and become most prominent in independence from Britain into the 1930s.
 174
 
Perhaps this is why above all his reversal to supporting separate states based on religion of the 
population surprised many. It seems the nature of socialism uniting people along class 
boundaries rather than religious or ethnic did not have the same appeal to Jinnah as it did with 
some of the other nationalists. Jinnah then displays the breadth of political spectrum that 
incorporated the nationalist movement. It certainly was not a movement solely populated by 
individuals with socialistic leanings. 
By 1928 there still was not a singular Communist Party of India. Instead the Communist 
International directed some of its words to the All-India Trade Union Congress, one of the 
scattered groups of leftist organization in India at the time. The letter stated that “your 
conference is taking place at a moment which may become the turning point in the history of 
national revolution.”175 Here we can see in the Communist International is acknowledging how 
purely Marxist rhetoric was not inciting the rebellions they were hoping. Instead they rebranded 
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their efforts as supporting of a nationalist struggle. Whereas Marxism sees the world as a system 
of class conflicts and nationalism as a way to keep the working classes from uniting, here they 
are admitting its reality and are appealing to nationalist tendencies. 
At the sixth Communist International Congress in 1928 the Soviet consensus was that it 
was finally high time to form a single communist party in India as its efforts to work through 
existing nationalist and trade organizations was working to no avail. The lofty goals were to 
“continue in the struggle against British imperialism for the emancipation of the country, the 
destruction of all of all survivals of feudalism, the agrarian revolution, and the establishment of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry in the form of a Soviet republic.”176 The process 
of building a successful communist party in India had been a difficult one, in that throughout the 
1920s “the Indian National Congress, lead by Mahatma Gandhi, completely dominated the 
Indian political scene.”177 M.N. Roy seemed to have overstated the communists‟ organization in 
India too when advocating for action and resources from the Soviet Union. The R.P. Dutt led 
CPGB became aware of this when it sent a member to report on their Indian comrades only to 
find “no evidence whatever of party organization.”178 The willingness to use violence as a tool to 
gain independence and ultimately to usher in communist revolution repelled many supporters of 
Gandhi, so it did not help that the party was suspected to receive arms and funding from sources 
foreign to India within the USSR.
179
  
The picture fellow communists had of the situation in India however differed greatly with 
that of the British. Other reports out of India seem to confirm British fears of communist 
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influence as Viceroy Lord Irwin expressed alarm at the growing communist influence and the 
Government of India claimed “there was hardly a single public utility or industry which had not 
been affected by in whole or in part by the wave of communism which had swept the 
country.”180 The organizations that would receive this funding existed in a number of Indian 
cities. This would indicate that any socialist rumblings were not a singular isolated anomaly, but 
indicative of a more widespread movement. The geographic spread of this information would 
have been concerning for a government trying to keep the lid on nationalist fervor. Unions of 
various strategically important industries were watched such as railway workers. A communist 
youth league was spied upon. Political parties with any kind of left leaning orientation made 
appearances in the intelligence files such as the Workers and Peasants Party and an interesting 
one known as the Ghadar Party. This was a Sikh organization founded by the immigrant 
community on the Pacific coast of the United States.
181
 
 Among the concerns of the British were ideological, nationalist support, direct funding, 
and oil. Oil was a resource of relative new importance to the British Empire. They suddenly had 
a renewed interest in the Middle East. It was of strategic importance to maintain the security of 
their oil resources, processing, and distribution capabilities at home and abroad. Within the IPI 
files is a thread of documents pertaining to Soviet oil interests within the British realm. Among 
the many documents, one here illustrates the innate distrust the British had for anything Soviet. 
In an explanation to an inquiry if a Soviet oil company could have interests beyond sales, the 
document states “their activites, like all those of the Soviet so-called „commercial‟ organizations, 
are never purely trading, and, as in the case of Arcos, they certainly cover a good deal of political 
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activity.”182 See Appendix F. Included in the files is a hand drawn map of Great Britain and all of 
the locations the Russian Naptha Syndicate operated.
183
 See Appendix G. Also included is a hand 
drawn map of the Caspian and Black Sea region and north into the Soviet Union detailing the oil 
pipelines and other oil infrastructure. In all there are over 50 separate documents regarding 
Soviet oil as pertaining to interests the Indian Political Intelligence found important. 
 Among the IPI collections are an assortment of other topics that link the activities in 
India to the Soviet Union. There are threads on propaganda, connections with foreign communist 
intrigue in places such as China, Persia, Turkey, even the United States. Connections with 
Islamist movements such as the Kalifat, which has an entire microfiche collection assigned to it 
are explored as well. Names such as Nehru and Gandhi appear relatively infrequently, but other 
notable names also appear such as the Indian Nobel winning poet Rabindranath Tagore regarding 
his travels and correspondences. 
The classic revolutionary support in the form of firearms and funding is also seen in the 
IPI files. One such report involves investigation and diplomatic posturing with the Soviet 
ambassador regarding 12,000 “old” Russian rifles suspected of being bought in Eastern Europe 
with the intention shipping them east to China and India.
184
 See Appendix H. Referring to 
mounting evidence of Soviet meddling in India, Sir Austen Chamberlain said in a debate in the 
House of Commons that  
The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary of that date made it unmistakably clear 
that we are not going to tolerate any form of propaganda that interfered in the 
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internal affairs either of this country or of any of the Dominions of this country or 
of any part of the British Empire.
185
 See Appendix I 
 
The propaganda Chamberlain was referring to is the types of documents and evidence that 
British officials would have been briefed on thanks to the existence of the Indian Political 
Intelligence. Material assistance tracked such as rifles was very low, however, in comparison to 
the number of documents tracking propaganda or the activities of the Communist International 
and various leftist organizations.  
As the 1920s gave way to the 1930s the activities of the Communist International 
decreased significantly. Where it held five congresses in the subsequent years following its 
founding in 1919, it would hold only one in the fifteen years following the Seventh Congress in 
1928. With the ascension of Joseph Stalin in the latter years of the 1920s, his “socialism in one 
country” policy turned the focus of the Soviet Union inward rather than Lenin‟s idealist 
spreading of the communist revolution. Various international communist parties altered their 
strategies as the original purpose of the Communist International dissipated since it had “lost any 
stable criterion by which to judge the „correctness‟ of any particular policy.”186 The body became 
mainly a symbolic venture as it no longer received the resources it had in the past when its goals 
were deemed of importance.  
The behavior of the Indian communists towards the independence movement in the years 
leading up to and during World War II alienated many Indians. The Soviet Union did not want to 
risk straining relations with their warming relations with the British as Hitler rose in Europe, and 
so instructed the communists in India to tone down resistance to British rule. It was on this point 
that Roy just could not waver and helped push himself out of the communist movement in India. 
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By this time however the party was receiving very little in terms of direct Soviet support and 
Roy had grown disillusioned with international communism. Roy‟s thoughts seem to be a bell 
weather here of the party‟s success as this caused the Communist Party of India to lose much of 
any kind of support it ever had from the public.  This called into question whether the Indian 
communists wanted Indian independence more or Soviet-led communist domination.  
This seems to be only half the picture though, as others have argued that the reason for 
communist failure is not as much failure by Indian communists but failure of the Communist 
International for not maintaining a coherent message and set of goals for international 
communism.
187
 One of Roy‟s major detractors in building the Indian Communist Party was that 
he lived away from India more than twenty years in places such as Berkeley, California where he 
mingled with the intellectual community. This was followed by travels to Mexico and Germany 
and so was not very well acquainted with the political realities in India upon his return in the 
1930s, namely the strength of Gandhism. He was accused by the Communist International of not 
accurately representing the realities of the revolutionary potential in India, and resulting from 
disagreements with the Communist International was eventually expelled from it in 1929. In the 
1930s Roy would be arrested and imprisoned for six years in India, join the Indian National 
Congress, split with it following entry into World War II, and in the final years of his life Roy 
even moved on from Marxism as a political philosophy.
188
 Quite a life, and an ideal person to 
investigate in order to better understand the influence the Soviet Union hoped to incur in British 
India.  
All things considered, Nehru seems to have been more directly influenced early on in his 
career as well. By the late 1930s Stalin shifted Soviet policy and Nehru became less than 
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inspired with Soviet Communism. Perhaps he also became more centrist as he lead the Indian 
National Congress and adhered more by the ideals of socialism which could be non-violent and 
more egalitarian than what was occurring in the Soviet Union. In 1938 Nehru wrote he was a 
socialist “in the sense that I believe in socialist theory and method of approach. I am not a 
Communist chiefly because I resist the tendency to treat Communism as holy doctrine, and I do 
not like being told what to think and what to do…I feel also there is too much violence 
associated with the Communist method and this produces untoward results as in Russia in recent 
years. The ends cannot be separated from the means.”189 The Gandhi influence here shines 
through. 
Bose follows the trend of that of Nehru and Roy by putting national independence as 
objective number one. His ordering of priorities is indicative of many nationalists, writing in 
1938 that “our main task in this age is to end imperialism and win national independence for the 
Indian people. When freedom comes, the age of national reconstruction will commence and that 
will be the socialist phase of our movement.”190 This socialism was not to be “blindly” followed 
in the footsteps of the West. Not “any –ism,” be it communism, liberalism, capitalism but he 
wanted an Indian type that could draw on all these other nations to learn from their 
experiences.
191
 At one point he said that India needed a socialist regime, but that it should be a 
“synthesis between Communism and Fascism,” though he later admitted to using a poor choice 
of words.
192
 He said that “communism today has no sympathy with nationalism” and that Russia 
today is on her defensive and has little interest in provoking a world revolution.” He would also 
voice sentiments that the anti-religious and atheistic views do not mesh with India. This interest 
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in Fascism would ultimately make his fame greater, but also lead to a position largely outside of 
the mainstream nationalist movement until his death leading a revolutionary army during World 
War II. 
While Bose was a self avowed socialist, his poor relations with fellow Indian 
Communists such as M.N. Roy, and the Soviet Union‟s seemingly disinterest in Indian 
independence turned him away from any direct communist ties. Instead he began to admire the 
leaders of fascist regimes which had so quickly taken power and lead their nations to 
prominence, Hitler, Mussolini, and the Tojo regime of Japan.
193
 He was a complicated individual 
who never could really be pinned down as a communist or fascist. If anything he was socialist in 
economics but fascist in leadership style. By this point however World War II had begun and 
attentions were being diverted to the war. Bose would go on to strengthen ties with the Axis 
powers by leading an army of Indians based out of Japanese conquered Southeast Asia and 
would establish the Provisional Government of Free India (based in Japanese controlled 
Singapore). He led the Indian National Army composed of Indian POWs and volunteers. It is an 
important event but is out of the context of this work as Bose and the Soviet Union did not have 
a relationship. As author V.S. Patil puts it, Bose was “neither a terrorist, nor a communist, nor a 
fascist. He was a militant freedom fighter, socialist, and humanitarian.”194 
 The IPI was still functioning long into the 1930s. It still had reports on the revolutionary 
training school that was established by the Soviet government in Tashkent, Uzbekistan with the 
aims of training individuals to become communist revolutionaries in their homelands. The 
Tashkent school was eventually shelved too however and a revolutionary school was established 
in Moscow. One document states that “it is a fact that Indians have been trained in revolutionary 
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propaganda at Tashkent.” The school in Moscow had been subject to British interest for a 
number of years after as well, as the 1936 document details “Indian Propaganda Schools in 
Moscow.”195 See Appendix J. Notice that schools is plural as other documents show a number of 
schools in Moscow in which Indians were believed to have been enrolled. See the list of twenty-
four Indians British intelligence collected. The list has names and suspected whereabouts, with 
one name simply being listed as “Dead.”196 See Appenidx K. By this stage though the volume of 
information regarding funding had largely dried up. As went the Communist International so did 
evidence of material revolutionary support. The Soviet influence in India ceased to be even 
Churchill‟s main concern by 1934 with the rise of Nazi Germany and communist revolution in 
China.
197
 See Appendix L. It appears the impending doom of British India at the hands of the 
Bolsheviks had been averted. 
 The Indian Political Intelligence did not shut down operations into the 1930s; it simply 
shifted its resources to more promising leads. The full listings of documents included in the IPI 
files are insightful in their own right.
198
 Keep in mind for this work mainly IPI 4 was consulted 
with some from IPI 6 as well. The volume of intelligence documentation is much greater than 
analyzed in this piece. As this table of contents from the IPI guide shows, IPI 4 and 6, the two 
used for this piece is just a small portion of the intelligence files that exists. Among the more 
interesting sections are IPI 5, on the Communist Party of Great Britain. The fact that an agency 
devoted to Indian politics has an entire subsection devoted to a phenomenon half a world away 
displays the truly global nature of the communist threat. The fears of conspiracy were not just 
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isolated hunches or scapegoats, but a threat with an ideological background, with support in 
multiple places (India, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain), and had mountains of evidence in 
the form of funding, intercepted correspondence, publishes, and so on. Perhaps it is unfair to say 
the British over reacted to the Soviet threat in India considering this, but at the same time their 
predisposed hostility to communism bread conditions for intelligence to confirm suspicions. 
Some of the attempts to connect widespread Indian unrest to Soviet influence simply fall short. 
IPI-7, the Meerut Conspiracy Case drives home this pinning of communism as the 
motivational force behind Indian unrest.
199
 The case involved Communist Party of Great Britain 
members arrested and charged with revolutionary activites in India. Through the course of the 
much publicized trial in India, connections with Indian trade and labor organizations were made 
clear. The Government of India used the evidence to crack down on socialist and revolutionary 
trends in India. The case ended in the imprisonment of these men, and put the movement in India 
on notice that the British government would not tolerate seditious behaviors. 
 IPI-11 is perhaps the other remaining collection of documents that would be most 
interesting to investigate further. On the League Against Imperialism, this is a congress that has 
been referenced in numerous intelligence sources. This seems to be the meeting point for anti-
British forces from the communist perspective and from the self-determination perspective. The 
meeting has an entire microfiche collection on it, but references to it also appear in the IPI 4 and 
6 collections. What the cornerstone for this study shows, the IPI 4 documents, is that they are not 
the end of the story. If 4 and 6 are any indication, IPI 5 and 11 enlarge the evidence the British 
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collected corroborating Soviet-lead communism to Indian unrest and the potential loss of their 
most important colony. 
IPI 8, 9, and 10 all report on various possible dangerous trends in Indian politics, but with 
the focus of these sections not explicitly socialist, and most likely not, they were not deemed as 
necessary, though a comparison with the non-leftist tendencies in Indian independence would be 
important to ground and context the discussion of Communism in Indian independence 
An alternative perspective to consider is if the Indian leaders accentuated any of these 
subversive activities to take advantage of a perception of British paranoia. This line of thinking 
could only be speculative but it is something to consider nonetheless. Historians generally have 
offered the sentiment that “the Communist party, in spite of governmental alarums, was too 
small,”200 presumably to successfully incite a Marxist revolution to overthrow British rule in 
India. Anything that was socialistic alarmed the British government in India and the big-business 
interests, at the top of this alarm was the founding of the Congress Socialist party in 1934.
201
 
This sort of leftist sentiment did not disappear from the nationalist movement into the 1930s, it 
just seems to have lost a major international ally‟s real support. 
 The dates in which the Indian Political Intelligence files were the most active would 
indicate the years the British remained most concerned with Soviet subversion. The majority of 
documents come from the 1920s rather than the 1930s. This is a pattern that mirrors the activity 
of the Communist International‟s activity. The stated goals of Stalin‟s “socialism in one country” 
program help to explain this. They turned the focus of the Soviet Union from international 
communist revolution to solidifying the stability of the Soviet Union. Britain‟s recognition of the 
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emerging threat of Hitler‟s Germany as a threat over Stalin‟s Soviet Union too could have played 
a role in the psyche of intelligence gathering. Relations between the Soviet Union and Great 
Britain would thaw as the recognition of a common enemy formed. 
 For Indian nationalists, what Nehru would articulate as an innate curiosity the Soviet 
Union represented for the people of India, devolved into an unfortunate scene of violence for the 
international community. The political thought of Gandhi and Stalin took further root in each 
country and wedged the two further apart. What may have developed into a relationship between 
the two nations and greatly alarmed the British in the years following World War I, became 
apparent into the 30s that whatever potential existed early on was no longer practical in a Gandhi 
dominated India. Early in these interwar years however, Britain was unsure how strong the 
appeal of Soviet communism would be. The quickly increasing momentum of the Indian 
nationalist movement seemed to overwhelm the ability of the British government to explain it in 
terms that did not admit that it may have been simply what it appeared, a nation that wanted 
home-rule. Instead the British framed the unrest in the context of Bolshevik conspiracies 
originating in the Soviet Union and disseminated home to Britain and to the colonies. Whether 
officials on the ground believed this or not is unknown, but the rampant anti-Soviet rhetoric gave 
the British a convenient common enemy from which provided talking points and explanation, 
and turned away introspective reasoning for the turmoil in India. 
The independence movement remained mainly nationalistic in the late 1930s as 
communists struggled to achieve relevance amidst accusations that they were working on behalf 
of foreign interests. But the interesting thing here is that even the most effective nationalists such 
as Gandhi and Nehru articulated the intrigue the Soviet Union represented for India. Roy is 
someone who embodied this connection the strongest, but was not simply an aberration in 
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history. The culmination of interest in Soviet communism and real connections between Indians 
and the Communist International was reason enough for the British to spy on these connections. 
Perhaps British efforts kept Soviet intrigue at a minimum, perhaps there never was a real Soviet 
threat to India, but regardless it was a concern that was very much a part of the British 
consciousness following World War I. If it were not for the shift in Soviet policy towards the end 
of the 1920s regarding International Communism, who is to say the types of support the Soviet 
Union would have offered Indian nationalists as their peak in Soviet curiosity seemed to occur 
just as the Communist International was losing relevance. 
85 
 
Conclusion 
 By the close of the 1930s the world was once again enveloped in world war. In one of 
history‟s most glaring example of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” Great Britain and the 
Soviet Union had found themselves allied with one another against Hitler and fascist Nazi 
Germany. Both nations geared all aspects of society to the war machine to ensure their survival. 
Even with Allied victory in 1945, it was clear Britain could no longer afford its empire and 
within two years India was granted independence. Partitioned between majority populations 
Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India, the British left the subcontinent with one final mess, yet 
independence was achieved at last. The Soviet Union had sacrificed immensely during the war. 
Estimates are of 27 million dead, more than the combined dead of all other nations. But there it 
was standing as a leader in a new bi-polar world defined between capitalism and communism. 
The sovereign India, democratic as Britain has designed, elected Jawaharlal Nehru as its first 
Prime Minster. Though his past curiosity with the Soviet Union had been known, the Nehru of 
independent India wanted nothing to do with Soviet communism, just some of the egalitarian 
ideals of socialism in general. He positioned India as a non-aligned nation straddling between 
rival ideologies of the United States and the Soviet Union and proved that the Nehru of the late 
1940s had no interest in falling under the hegemony of another foreign power but that India 
would stand on its own for the first time in centuries. 
The Soviet Union under Stalin entering World War II had much different priorities than 
the Soviet Union emerging out of World War I under Lenin. Whereas in the initial years of the 
Soviet Union it was seen as the first stage of a global communist revolution, roughly twenty 
years had passed and instead it focused on maintaining its defenses in a world with hostile 
ideologies of capitalism and fascism. The Communist International barely convened, just once 
more in 1935, and Stalin disbanded it all together in the midst of the war in 1943. The role of the 
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Soviet Union in India began as a possible alternative to revolution in Europe in the first couple of 
years after World War I. While Soviet leaders spoke of supporting communist parties across the 
world, and invited leaders from around the world to Moscow, its contributions remained largely 
educational and ideological. Money and some arms made their way to India, but the evidence of 
large scale material assistance is scarce in consideration of the scale of size of India. By the time 
Joseph Stalin was in charge of the USSR, his brand of “socialism in one country” refocused 
resources to strengthening the Union rather than actively encouraging revolutions abroad. The 
Soviet Union dabbled in playing a role in Indian independence, but ultimately decided it was out 
of its realm of possibility considering the resources and possible international repercussions of 
involving itself on a larger scale. 
 Indian nationalists following World War I agitated for greater and greater degrees of 
autonomy as they believed India had proven its loyalty and worth during the war. The growing 
number of western educated Indians and growing class of civil servants argued for their rights to 
democracy and were armed with the additional tool of national self-determination. As Great 
Britain chose instead to restrict freedoms rather than increase them, the opposing ideology of the 
Soviet Union drew the curiosity of many. They saw in it a system that openly condemned 
imperialism, and claimed the ideals of equality, in whatever form including racial. While things 
like acceptance of armed violence and denunciation of religion made the Soviet brand of 
communism incompatible in an India politically dominated by Gandhi, it nonetheless drew 
interest from a number of nationalist leaders. M.N. Roy would be the one most associated with 
communism in India, but even he failed to form a single communist party in the country until 
late in the 1920s and by then support from the USSR was haphazard at best. Communism never 
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gained a strong footing in the colony of India, and never had the popular support that other 
nationalist-first oriented groups did. 
 Great Britain emerged from World War I still in firm grasp of its colonial possessions, 
and in no hurry to give them up. Unrest increased in India while anti-colonial rhetoric spewed 
from the new Soviet Union, a nation founded on an ideology that sought the overthrow of the 
capitalist world. From the British perspective in India, they had two groups interested in their 
loss of the colony; Indian nationalists who wanted independence and the Soviet Union who stood 
to benefit from any loss of power by the British Empire. This is in addition to the historic rivalry 
in Afghanistan, the traditional invasion route to India, between Russia and Britain in the 
nineteenth century known as The Great Game. For an intelligence community that simply did not 
have the resources to track and explain the mass movement that was Indian nationalism, in a 
nation of hundreds of millions, foreign influences became the more convenient target. In an 
atmosphere of severe anti-Soviet rhetoric, watching the efforts of leftist organizations and honing 
in on anything that could be traced to the Soviet Union was a natural outgrowth. It became a sort 
of positive feedback loop, if you will, as suspicions of Bolshevik conspiracy and a Red Scare in 
Britain caused intelligence officials, who had to filter and prioritize intelligence, to focus on 
anything that could be linked to the Soviet Union. This meant a disproportionate amount of 
evidence was documented concerning communism and Soviet links compared to accepting the 
reality of the mass appeal of Gandhi and Indian nationalism. This would have reinforced the 
preexisting biases within British leadership regarding Soviet influence in India and the cycle 
continued until an appreciable amount of time proved a communist revolution in India was not 
forthcoming. 
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 The area of imperial intelligence is a fascinating field seemingly ripe with possibilities. 
The Indian Political Intelligence files, while mentioned in relative passing by some recent 
historians, seem to offer a wealth of material. The most recent research by Andrew Muldon 
makes some use of the files, but in even less depth than this piece. He uses their existence as 
evidence to back up his discussion on intelligence in the colonies. Further research into the IPI 
files as the focus would increase the ease at which historians of the intelligence community, 
colonial historians, and historians of international communism could locate and analyze 
documents pertaining to their areas of interest. What this work did was just touch the tip of the 
iceberg regarding these three diverse subject areas. Each could undoubtedly be expanded to 
provide further insight and corroboration between events and individuals mentioned in the files, 
and other independent sources in their various contexts. It could also prove fruitful to use the 
files in comparison with other colonial administrations, whether within the British Empire or 
with another nation such as France or Spain. The intelligence files give a glimpse into a world 
where communist intrigue was at its highest, and when a ruling force had potential threats to its 
power from a number of sources, both domestic and international. 
 What any discussion of intelligence leads to can cause governments and societies to 
question the effectiveness of the tools employed by authority over people. Information is all in 
the eye of the beholder. It is one thing to collect copious amounts of raw data, but a complete 
other thing to interpret and analyze it. That part of the process is completely subjective and open 
to the influences of any number of factors, from societal influences to the private opinions of an 
individual. At each level the added layers of bureaucracy introduce new variables to the 
equation, and greater degrees of uncertainty regarding its interpretation. The generation of 
information in Imperial British India from surveillance on the ground, to officials at police and 
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intelligence bureaus, to officials in Britain and its leaders, back to official policy and directives 
for the intelligence operations in India introduced at each stage considerations and biases 
potentially completely independent of the real events in India. Resource limitations meant 
intelligence gathering had to be prioritized, while prejudices influenced where those limited 
resources would be spent. A selection bias in the information leaders had available was a definite 
possibility which is difficult pinpoint in retrospect, and would have been close to impossible to 
discern while amidst the moment. This introduced the possibility for British officials to see more 
of what they feared without the fair context of the rest of Indian political turmoil in the 
increasing nationalist fervor of Gandhi‟s India. These purely nationalist elements certainly were 
not ignored, but for leaders such as Winston Churchill, Gandhi just did not incite the same fear 
and angst for those at home in Britain as Lenin and Stalin did.  
All this begs the question: how much are the decisions of our leaders based on fact, and 
how much is based on reinforcements of what they think they already know? If the Soviet Union 
was not so vocal about its initial ambitions for spreading communism, would British leadership 
have expressed such hostility towards it? Without an atmosphere of deep suspicion and contempt 
for the Soviet Union would political intelligence reports in India have honed in on socialist 
leaning or Soviet-tied documents with such ferocity? These are questions which cannot be 
definitively answered, but their example illustrates a point that is not unique to interwar British 
India. Rarely is the information at the disposal of our leaders pure, unbiased and raw data. Even 
the information that leads to decision making is the result of a long process subject to human 
interpretation and error. While this can never be truly avoided, it can be taken into account. At no 
point does it appear the British were aware that their intelligence was at least partially a product 
of their own conception. 
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Appendix A 
 
Diagram of Organization of the Government of the Soviet Union  
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Appendix B 
 
6-2-1930, Tashkent 
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Appendix C 
 
Aug. 1922, Despatch of Communist Funds to India 
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Appendix D 
 
10-26-1923, Bombay USSR Bank 
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Appendix E 
 
11-9-1923, Bank surveillance 
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Appendix F 
 
1-17-1928, India Office Correspondence 
 
 
96 
 
Appendix G 
 
Map on Russian Oil 
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Appendix H 
 
6-4-1930, Russian Rifles 
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Appendix I 
 
7-5-1929, House of Commons Debate 
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Appendix J 
 
7-2-1936, Schools in Moscow 
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Appendix K 
 
List…Dead 
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Appendix K (continued) 
 
List…Dead 
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Appendix L - Guide to Indian Political Intelligence (IPI) Files 
 
IPI-1. Organisation and personnel --  
IPI-2. Islam and the Khilafat movement, 1912-1949 --  
IPI-3. Inter-departmental Committee on Eastern Unrest, 1922-1927 --  
IPI-4. Communism: Russia, 1922-1938 --  
IPI-5. Communist Party of Great Britain, 1921-1948 --  
IPI-6. Communism: India & Indian Communist Party, 1921-1950 --  
IPI-7. Meerut conspiracy case, 1928-1933 --  
IPI-8. Revolutionary and terrorist activities, 1914-1942 --  
IPI-9. Control and censorship, 1918-1949 --  
IPI-10. Indian National Congress, 1928-1947 --  
IPI-11. League against Imperialism, 1925-1942 --  
IPI-12. Other organisations and movements, 1921-1947 --  
IPI-13. North America, 1912-1948 --  
IPI-14. Axis Powers, 1924-1949 --  
IPI-15. Other 'country' files, 1921-1949 --  
IPI-16. Personal files, 1916-1949 --  
IPI-17. Miscellaneous reports and subjects, 1924-1949 
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